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Purpose: The study aims to investigate whether female representation on corporate 
boards impacts company financial and non-financial performance. Existing studies 
show conflicting results regarding the impact that female representation on the boards 
of directors may have on financial and non-financial performance, namely social and 
environmental performance. Studies suggest that critical mass may influence the 
impact that a woman on the board may have on company performance. Existing 
studies have observed behavioural changes in female directors when there are three 
or more women on the board compared to when there are less than three women on 
the board. The study will explore the effects of critical mass on the impact of board 
female representation on firm performance. Furthermore, studies posit that single-
country studies contribute to conflicting results due to the influence of country-level 
factors. Country-level factors (including cultural norms, gender parity in terms of 
educational attainment, economic employment and opportunity) may influence the 
level of impact that female representation on the boards of directors have on company 
performance. Thus, this study explores whether country-level factors influence the 
impact of board female representation on company performance.  
Design: Using a linear mixed regression, an analysis of female representation (as 
measured by the percentage of women on the board and critical mass) of the top 100 
listed companies from Australia, Japan and South Africa between financial and non-
financial performance during 2016 to 2018 is performed. Both accounting and market 
measures are used to determine a holistic measure of financial performance. Non-
financial performance is measured using a social and environmental performance 
score. To determine the influence of country level factors, interaction terms are used 
to compare the level of impact that female representation on the boards of directors 
have on company performance between Australia, Japan and South Africa. In 
addition, an analysis of the mean female representation by country is conducted to 
understand the existing level of female representation per country. 
Findings: The descriptive statistics show that female representation was highest in 
Australia with an average of 29% over the three-year period; South Africa was at 22% 
and Japan at only 7%, demonstrating that each country in the study has varying levels 
of female representation on the boards of directors. The regression results show that 
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female representation on boards of directors, as measured by the percentage of 
women on the board, is shown to have a positive and significant relationship with 
accounting performance, market performance and social performance. Critical mass 
of female representation on corporate boards is shown to positively and significantly 
influence financial performance but has little impact on non-financial performance. 
Conversely, country-level factors do not significantly influence the level of impact of 
female representation on performance measures. However, the descriptive statistics 
suggest that country-level factors are shown to influence the number of women on the 
boards of directors. 
 
Originality and Value: This study is relevant to shareholders and stakeholders when 
considering board composition and the value of gender diversity on corporate boards 
for both financial and non-financial performance. In addition, this study aids the 
understanding of the current status of female representation on boards of directors. 
The study adds to the existing body of research by exploring the influence of critical 
mass and country-level factors on the impact of board gender diversity on company 
performance. Lastly, the study is relevant to regulators and policy-makers as it 
highlights factors which contribute to increased female representation on corporate 
boards. 
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“Shareholders had been asking, ‘When are you going to have a woman?’ So they put 
a woman on just to say they had a woman. She had to break down brick walls to be 
heard. She had to work hard to get into the conversation, almost like not being there. 
Management was not interested in her competency. It was an old boys’ club, and no 
one on the board wanted a female” (Konrad, Kramer, & Erkut, 2008, p. 145). 
 
The role of women in society and in the workplace has changed dramatically over the 
past century. The proportion of women in the labour force has grown considerably 
from about 30% in the 1950s (Catalyst, 2019) to 49% in 2018 (International Labour 
Organization, 2018). Although women make up almost half the labour force, only 24% 
of senior roles are held by women globally and only 15% of boards of directors (“the 
board”) worldwide are women (Catalyst, 2019; Smith & Parrotta, 2018). Furthermore, 
females made up less than 5% of Fortune 500 companies Chief Executive Officers 
(CEOs) in 2018 (Zillman, 2019). 
 
Countries have started to introduce gender quotas for female representation on boards 
in the last 10 years. These quotas range from a legislated mandatory 40% of women 
on the board in Norway and Spain (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Isidro & Sobral, 2015) to 
voluntary targets for under-represented genders in Denmark (Isidro & Sobral, 2015). 
Diversity in boards is shown to improve the advisory function of the board (Anderson, 
Reeb, Upadhyay, & Zhao, 2011) owing to a broader pool of knowledge and skills 
(Harrison & Klein, 2007). Studies suggest that specific attributes of women, such as 
their leadership style, (Nielsen & Huse, 2010), ethical values (Yasser, Al Mamun, & 
Ahmed, 2017), professional skills (Kim & Starks, 2016) and background (Peterson & 
Philpot, 2007) allow women to contribute to board diversity and, therefore, enhance 
decision-making (Nielsen & Huse, 2010). Although women may contribute to better 
quality decision-making, uncertainty exists whether these decisions result in improved 
profitability for the company. Literature has shown inconclusive results regarding the 
specific value that women add to company financial performance (Gregory-Smith, 
Main, & O’Reilly, 2014; Isidro & Sobral, 2015; Yang, Riepe, Moser, Pull, & Terjesen, 
2019). Studies have shown that the correlation between female representation on the 
board and financial performance can be positive (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2016; Sanan, 2016), 
negative (Adams & Ferreira, 2009) or not correlated at all (Gregory-Smith et al., 2014; 
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Wachudi & Mboya, 2012). This study aims to answer the following question: Does the 
presence/inclusion of female representation on the board have an impact on company 
financial performance? 
 
Limited research been undertaken on the relationship between female representation 
on the board and non-financial performance. Isidro and Sobral (2015) suggest that 
women add value to company performance indirectly through better compliance with 
ethical and social standards. Social and environmental factors are becoming 
increasingly important for companies (Eccles & Saltzman, 2011). A small, but growing 
body of research has found that women impact social performance but not 
environmental performance (Alazzani, Hassanein, & Al-Janadi, 2017). Consequently, 
the study extends to a second research question: Does the presence/inclusion of 
female representation on the board have an impact on company non-financial 
performance?  
 
Critical mass has been noted as a potential reason for the aforementioned mixed 
results. Women are shown to behave differently when there are more women in the 
boardroom, thus the lack of critical mass may influence the results seen in existing 
literature. Research suggests that the contribution of women is limited where they 
experience tokenism and stereotyping in circumstances of lower levels of female 
representation (Konrad et al., 2008). Companies with three or more women on the 
board benefit more from their female directors’ contribution than those with fewer than 
three (Joecks, Pull, & Vetter, 2013). Few studies have incorporated critical mass into 
the interpretation of results, largely owing to low levels of female representation 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Lückerath-Rovers, 2013). This study aims to include critical 
mass as a measure of female representation to ascertain whether financial and non-
financial performance differs between companies with and those without critical mass.  
 
Research has further highlighted country-level factors and single-entity studies as 
potential causes for inconclusive results. Country-level factors such as cultural norms 
(Low, Roberts, & Whiting, 2015), gender parity in terms of educational attainment 
(Rodriguez-Kiino, 2018), economic participation and job opportunities (Terjesen, 
Couto, & Francisco, 2016) may influence the number of women on the board, as well 
as the impact that women may have on company performance (Byron & Post, 2016). 
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However, no research has found empirical evidence to support a conclusion of a 
differential impact on company performance by female representation on the board as 
a result of country-level factors. The research aims to address this gap in the literature 
by performing a cross-country comparison of countries with different cultural norms 
and levels of gender parity, resulting in the final research question: Do country-level 
factors influence the impact that female representation on the board has on company 
performance? 
 
To answer the research questions, this study uses a sample of companies from 
Australia, South Africa and Japan over a three-year period between 2016 and 20181. 
Financial and non-financial performance measures will be regressed separately 
against the two independent variables, namely the percentage of women2 on the board 
and critical mass for each company per year. For the purposes of this study, critical 
mass is regarded as at least three women on the board of directors, thus separate 
regressions are performed. Interaction terms between the categorical country 
variables and the independent variables are used to determine the influence of 
country-level factors. 
 
The results indicate that female representation on the board (measured as the 
percentage of women on the board) has a statistically significant positive impact on 
both accounting and market measures of financial performance and non-financial 
social performance. Critical mass (measured as at least three women on the board) is 
shown to improve financial performance measures but has no bearing on improved 
social performance measures. This result suggests that critical mass enhances the 
contribution that women make towards achieving improved financial performance. 
However, critical mass is not an essential determinant for improved social 
performance. These findings support those in the reviewed literature that women add 
                                                          
1 Refer to the “Sample Selection” section under the Method Chapter for the sample selection 
justification. 
 
2 For the purposes of this study, the heteronormative definition of gender is used.  The 
heteronormative definition of gender as per Allen and Mendez (2018, p. 70) is defined as “cisgender, 
masculine presenting men and cisgender, feminine presenting women”. 
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to effective decision-making (Nielsen & Huse, 2010) and that their different skills (Kim 
& Starks, 2016), background (Peterson & Philpot, 2007) and values (Yasser et al., 
2017) make a differential contribution that improves not only financial performance, 
but also has social impact.  
 
The results also show that country-level factors have no statistically significant 
influence on the measured impact on company performance of female representation 
on the board of directors. However, the descriptive statistics suggest that country-level 
factors influence the number of women on the board. Female representation on the 
board of directors is higher in countries with equal educational attainment and 
economic participation and opportunity for women. Educational attainment for women 
was shown to be an important factor. However, the descriptive statistics suggest that 
education opportunities without economic opportunities for women to participate in the 
work force may limit female representation on the board of directors. 
 
The research presents novel findings on how country-level factors influence the impact 
of board female representation on company performance. The research adds to the 
existing body of research that explores the influence of female representation on 
financial performance. The research further contributes to the limited research on the 
value that women bring to non-financial measures, such as social and environmental 
impact. The study assists in the understanding of the differential contribution women 
bring to the board and the need to increase gender diversity at a board level beyond 
merely meeting statutory requirements. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: relevant literature is reviewed and 
the research method is set out. These sections are followed by the presentation of 
both descriptive and statistical results. Lastly, a conclusion, appendices and a 





The literature review starts by addressing the relevance of board diversity in a 
company. The review further examines gender diversity, how men and women are 
viewed differently, and whether men and women possess different skills pertinent to 
board membership. Existing literature on the impact of gender diversity on company 
performance is explored, including possible causes for the mixed results observed. 
Lastly, the current position of female representation on company boards is examined 




The separation of ownership and management was introduced in order to ensure inter 
alia firm survival (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The separate role of management is to 
maximise firm value for owners and stakeholders (Freeman, Wicks, & Parmar, 2004). 
Today, separation between ownership by shareholders and control by the board is 
commonly practiced by companies.  
 
Traditionally, the main boards of directors have consisted of males with similar 
backgrounds (Hillman, Canella, & Harris, 2002). Research has shown that diverse 
expertise arises from differences in knowledge and experiences of the group (Harrison 
& Klein, 2007). Consequently, heterogeneity increases the pool of skills available 
(Eisenhardt, Kahwajy, & Bourgeois, 1998; Miliken & Martins, 1996; Nielsen & Huse, 
2010).  
 
The board’s primary function is to make financial, strategic, operational (Ferreira, 
2010) and sustainability decisions (Liao, Lin, & Zhang, 2018) to maximise company 
value. These decisions are made through 1) voting on major proposals, 2) hiring and 
evaluating managers, 3) monitoring managerial activities, and 4) offering expert advice 
to top managers (Anderson et al., 2011). Anderson et al. (2011) focused on the third 
and fourth of the aforementioned activities and showed that heterogeneity of the board 
of directors improves managerial monitoring and advising. 
 
Decisions taken by the board are often complex. Nielsen and Huse (2010) suggests 
that in times of uncertainty, diverse groups perform better than homogenous groups. 
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In particular, women, on average, tend to perform better than men in times of 
uncertainty (Van Staveren, 2014). Terjesen, Couto and Francisco (2016) found that 
companies with complex business environments are more likely to have better gender 
diversity. Further, diversity at a board level enhances the board’s understanding of the 
company’s products and customer demographic as a result of the individual’s 
experience with the company as the customer (Robinson & Dechant, 1997). 
  
The review of existing literature examined the dynamics of group decision-making 
between majorities and minorities3. Minorities with dissenting views may enhance the 
quality of the decision-making by influencing the majority to earnestly consider their 
views (Asch, 1955; Levine, 2017). In theory, when there are opposing views, the group 
can move in three ways: 1) the majority conforms to the minority, 2) the minority 
conforms to the majority or 3) the group reaches a compromise (Levine, 2017). 
Practically, studies demonstrate that minorities are more likely to conform when there 
are difficult, ambiguous decisions to be made, the minorities doubt their abilities 
(Levine, 2017) or the minorities feel that they are alone in their view (Asch, 1955). A 
person with a minority view is also more likely to raise his/her opposing view if such 
person knows he/she has an ally or support from someone else in the group (Asch, 
1955). Therefore, with the appropriate support, minorities bring diversity and opposing 
views to the group and thus contribute to effective decision-making (Konrad et al., 
2008). 
  
Men and women display different behaviours, possess different skill sets and have 
different experiences (Barber & Odean, 2001; Rodriguez-Kiino, 2018; Yasser et al., 
2017). Women are also predominantly a minority on corporate boards (Lückerath-
Rovers, 2013). These factors contribute to effective decision-making. Kim and Starks 
(2016) prove that the presence of women results in higher quality advice and 
enhances the board’s advisory effectiveness through women’s unique skill set.  
 
                                                          
3 Minorities are defined as being numerically smaller than the majority, challenge the dominant view 




Differences in skills between men and women in relation to business have been 
explored through a wide body of research (Kim & Starks, 2016). Women have been 
shown to have more international experience and less executive experience than men 
(Zelechowski & Bilimoria, 2004). Women have experience outside corporate such as 
at universities and non-profit organisations (Sealy, Singh, & Vinnicombe, 2007; Singh, 
Terjesen, & Vinnicombe, 2008). Women’s’ professional backgrounds normally differ 
to those of male CEOs (which tend to be similar to other male directors) (Peterson and 
Philpot, 2007). Kim and Starks (2016) examined the commonality and scarcity of 
required skills amongst existing board members and noted that four out of the five4 
scarce skills were more likely to be possessed by women.  
 
Reviewed studies observe that owing to different social roles, women also have higher 
ethical values (Kennedy & Kray, 2014; Yasser et al., 2017). Glover, Bumpus, Sharp 
and Munchus (2002) examined differences between men and women in relation to 
ethical versus economic decisions through a series of decision-based questionnaires. 
The participants consisted of business students with varying academic performance 
and work experience. The results showed that male participants were 1.5 - 2.3 times 
more likely than females to choose unethical actions. Eweje and Brunton (2010) 
performed a similar study and found that men were four times more likely than women 
to behave unethically. Furthermore, women were shown to have a better 
understanding than men of the ethical implications in a business environment. 
However, Valentine and Rittenburg (2007) noted that although there is no difference 
in ethical judgement between men and women, women expressed a stronger intention 
to act ethically. Contrary to this research, a more recent study found that there were 
no significant differences between decisions of an ethical nature between men and 
women. Rather, ethical behaviour can be taught and it is not necessarily innate to a 
particular gender (Taylor, 2013). 
 
                                                          
4 The five scarce areas of expertise on the board of directors identified by Kim and Starks (2016) are 
as follows: Research and Development, Human Resources, Risk Management, Sustainability and 




The reviewed literature shows that board diversity influences the decision-making of 
the group. Men and women possess unique skills and experiences which influence 
how decisions are made. The next theme in this review of literature considers how in 
times of uncertainty, strong leadership and crisis management are imperative skills 
that require effective decision-making at a board level. Existing literature in the 
Stereotypes, Crisis Management and Leadership Styles subsection below has 
explored the relevance of gender, and whether men and women differ in terms of 
leadership and crisis management. 
 
Stereotypes, Crisis Management and Leadership Styles 
The different skills of men and women have been examined in various areas of 
business and the workplace. Leadership and crisis management are areas that have 
been noted in literature in which men and women have displayed different behaviour. 
Leadership and crisis management are traits relevant to the function of the board of 
directors and thus are of particular interest to this study. Differences in leadership and 
management styles have been explained historically by stereotypical views of men 
and women. However, some research suggests that it is because of these stereotypes 
that men and women behave differently. 
 
Stereotypes 
Eagly and Steffen (1984) examined the stereotypical beliefs of men and women and 
how these people are distributed into different social roles. Typically, women are 
viewed as communal5, and men as agentic6 (Eagly & Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001; 
Eagly & Steffen, 1984). Traditional leadership qualities are typically viewed as 
“masculine” qualities because they are more agentic (Bass, Avolio, & Atwater, 1996). 
 
Historically, women would perform tasks such as looking after the children which 
require nurturing, love and care. These qualities then became associated with 
femininity. This argument was developed through observation of women performing 
                                                          
5 Communal qualities are defined as selflessness and showing concern for others (Eagly & Steffen, 
1984) 





these tasks. However, it is further argued that just because women perform tasks that 
require love and care, this does not mean women are more loving and caring. i.e. more 
communal, than men (Eagly & Steffen, 1984). 
 
Early studies by Eagly and Steffen (1984) examined men and women in the workplace 
at different job grades, with different marital statuses, children dependencies, and 
whether the men and women worked by choice or out of necessity. This research was 
conducted in order to examine the perception of agency and community between men 
and women. In all cases, women were perceived as both more agentic and more 
communal than men except in the cases in which men and women had children. 
Married women with children were shown to be almost equally agentic and communal, 
whereas married men with children were shown to be more communal than agentic 
and even more communal than married women. This early study concludes that the 
stereotypes of men being especially agentic and women being especially communal 
do not always hold true. 
 
Men and women further differ in how they deal with adversity. As children, girls tend 
to accept responsibility for academic failure (Rijavec & Brdar, 1997) and apply more 
isolation, self-blame and reflection after making a decision (Al-Bahrani, Aldhafri, 
Alkharusi, Kazem, & Alzubiadi, 2013; Jose & Kilburg, 2007). This behaviour is also 
seen in adulthood. Women tend to attribute poor performance on a task to their own 
incompetence, whereas men tend to attribute poor performance to bad luck – this fact 
accounts for the self-attribution bias observed in men (Minter, Gruppen, Napolitano, & 
Gauger, 2005). When making decisions, women tend to remember their thought-
processes and mistakes and spend more time considering decisions, resulting in a 
stronger negative recall bias than men (Beyer, 1998) and better foresight into negative 
consequences (Hillman, 2015). Conversely, considering multiple views can be time 
consuming and prolong decisions resulting in inefficient decision-making (Rose, 
2007). Men have been shown to make quicker decisions focused on economic gain 
with limited consideration for other factors (Hillman, 2015). 
 
Crisis Management 
Research suggests that women tend to be more sensitive to stressors (Al-Bahrani et 
al., 2013), more risk-averse (Willows & West, 2014) and to prefer secure returns over 
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riskier returns (Croson & Gneezy, 2009). Conversely, men tend to be less aware of 
stressors (Al-Bahrani et al., 2013) and prefer high-risk/high-reward strategies because 
these are viewed as challenges rather than threats (Cesaroni, Sentuti, & Buratti, 
2015). As a result, gender-diverse corporate boards have been shown to have a lower 
risk ‘appetite’ and thus perform differently to homogenous boards (Bernile, Bhagwat, 
& Yonker, 2018; Yang et al., 2019).  
 
Cesaroni et al. (2015) examined whether male and female entrepreneurs responded 
differently to the same crisis: namely the economic recession of 2008/97. It was noted 
that women tend to approach business differently because their goals are different. 
Women are less interested in rapid expansion and financial growth and more 
interested in a manageable yet sizeable business that allows for work-family life 
balance. Cesaroni et al. (2015) showed that entrepreneurs in crisis generally deploy 
defensive mechanisms, such as downsizing and increasing efficiency, that guarantee 
the survival of the business rather than offensive strategies, such as innovation and 
new investments. However, women have been shown to have a higher propensity for 
defensive mechanisms than men. This finding further demonstrates that women are 
more risk averse than men. Therefore, women are more likely to implement strategies 
with proven histories of success.  
 
Leadership Styles 
Leadership styles can be divided into different categories depending on which aspect 
of leadership is being considered. For example, leadership could be democratic or 
autocratic, transactional or transformational. Democratic leaders allow employees to 
be part of the decision-making process whereas autocratic leaders give the direction 
and decision process to employers (Eagly & Johnson, 1990). Transactional leaders 
set out tasks and employees are rewarded for achieving them. Transformational 
leaders set out the overarching goal and develop employees in working towards the 
broader vision (Khan, Nawaz, & Khan, 2016). Situational leadership posits that 
different leadership styles may be effective in different scenarios (Khan et al., 2016) 
                                                          
7 A global economic recession caused by the deflation of the housing bubble in early 2007 (World 
Economic Forum, 2018b). 
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and that gender may influence the effectiveness of the leader (Eklund, Barry, & 
Grunberg, 2017). 
 
Eagly and Johannesen-Schmidt (2001) explored different leadership styles between 
men and women. The study found that women tend to be more democratic and men 
more autocratic. Furthermore, women may tend towards more democratic styles 
because they encounter resistance when their authority is exercised (Ridgeway, 
2001). Differences between men and women in the effectiveness of their respective 
leadership styles have also been explored. Women were shown to be more effective 
managers than men (Eagly & Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001). Consistent with the 
findings of Barber and Odean (2001), women are considered to be more effective than 
men because women have to achieve better performances to maintain leadership 
roles (Eagly & Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001) owing to the perception that men are more 
competent than women (Biernat & Fuegen, 2001). Furthermore, women may also be 
more effective managers because they have shown themselves to be more attentive 
and considerate (Eagly & Steffen, 1984). However, Eagly, Karau and Makhijan (1995) 
and Hoyt (2017) expand this observation by noting that both men and women are 
effective leaders, but men and women may be differently effective in different settings 
(Eagly et al., 1995). Men were shown to be more effective in male-dominated roles 
and settings that are congenial to men (such as the military), whereas women excelled 
in areas that were congenial to women. Leaders were found to be most effective when 
the leadership role was congruent with their gender and, by extension, their leadership 
style (Eagly et al., 1995; Hoyt, 2017). Differences in behaviours, communication and 
leadership styles between men and women are pertinent attributes in the boardroom 
because these qualities influence decision-making (Terjesen et al., 2016).  
 
Conversely, Bartol and Butterfield (1976) showed that gender and leadership style are 
independent of each other. Pounder and Coleman (2002) found that gender is not a 
key factor in leadership style, but rather stereotyping of men and women leads to the 
perception of differences in leadership styles. Supporting this argument, Daher, 
Guillaume and Crawshaw (2018) suggest that it is the perception of the male 
subordinate group that drives the leadership style rather than the perception of the 
female subordinate group. Similarly, Hoyt (2017) posits that women experience more 
bias in male-dominated contexts. Hoyt (2017) further notes that regardless of whether 
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gender in leadership ought to matter, gender in leadership in fact does matter because 
the awareness of stereoptypes and expectations of gender roles influence behaviour. 
Haines, Deaux and Lofaro (2016) examined whether or not the stereotypes applicable 
to women that existed in 1983 still existed more recently. Historically and 
stereotypically, men have been considered more agentic (and thus, according to the 
stereotype, are considered to have more leadership traits), whereas women have 
been considered to display more communal traits. The research study showed that 
these stereotypes still existed in 2016. These findings remained prevalent despite 
women currently occupying more leadership roles than in the past (Hoyt, 2017). 
 
Research has shown that historically men and women have played different roles in 
both society and the business world and, thus, gender stereotypes have developed 
over time. Differences between men and women are further highlighted through the 
different responses of men and women in dealing with adverse situations, decision-
making and leadership styles. These are significant factors in the boardroom because 
they have an influence on a company’s performance. Research further highlights the 
fact that although stereotypes of men and women exist, they do not always hold true. 
 
Board Diversity and Financial Performance 
Much research has investigated the impact on firm performance of having women on 
a board of directors (Gordini & Rancati, 2017; Isidro & Sobral, 2015; Kakabadse et al., 
2015; Sanan, 2016; Terjesen et al., 2016; Willows & van der Linde, 2016). However, 
the results have been inconclusive. Studies have used different time periods, 
countries, measures of gender diversity and different performance measures as 
variables which may have contributed to conflicting results. 
 
Studies performed between 2000 and 2014 showed mixed results regarding the 
correlation between the presence of female directors and company performance. 
Some studies found a positive correlation (Lückerath-Rovers, 2013), some found a 
negative correlation (Adams & Ferreira, 2009) and some found no correlation at all 
(Gregory-Smith et al., 2014; Wachudi & Mboya, 2012). 
 
Since 2015, research has shown consistently that women have a positive impact on 
financial performance in terms of accounting measures, such as Return on Equity 
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(ROE)8, Return on Assets (ROA)9 and Return on Sales (ROS)10 (Gordini & Rancati, 
2017; Green & Homroy, 2018; Isidro & Sobral, 2015; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2016; Terjesen et 
al., 2016; Willows & van der Linde, 2016).  However, the impact on market measures 
of performance still vary (Gordini & Rancati, 2017; Isidro & Sobral, 2015; Sabatier, 
2015; Sanan, 2016; Terjesen et al., 2016; Willows & van der Linde, 2016; Yang et al., 
2019). 
 
Kılıç and Kuzey (2016) examined the impact of female representation on the board on 
company performance in terms of accounting measures in Turkey. Three different 
measures of gender diversity were used: 1) whether or not there were any female 
directors, 2) the proportion of female directors and 3) Blau’s Index.11 The results of this 
study indicated that women have a significant and positive effect on company 
performance as measured by ROA and ROE. This finding is consistent with results 
found in India (Sanan, 2016) and South Africa (Willows & van der Linde, 2016), which, 
in common with Turkey, are both emerging markets. Other studies explored the impact 
of female directors on financial performance using a sample from different countries. 
Terjesen et al. (2016) explored the impact of independent female directors across 47 
countries and Isidro and Sobral (2015) examined 16 European countries, both using 
ROA as a performance measure. Both studies concluded that female representation 
on the board of directors has a positive impact on company performance in terms of 
accounting measures. 
 
Tobin’s Q12 has been used as a market measure of performance in a number of studies 
(Marinova, Plantenga, & Remery, 2016; Reguera-Alvarado, de Fuentes, & Laffarga, 
                                                          
8 Return on Equity (ROE) is measure of financial performance calculated by dividing net profit over 
equity. 
9 Return on Assets (ROA) is measure of financial performance calculated by dividing profit over 
assets. 
10 Return on Sales (ROS) is measure of financial performance calculated by dividing profit over sales. 
11 Blau’s Index is a measure of gender diversity. It is defined as the probability that two members 
randomly selected from a population will be in different categories if the population size is infinite 
(Solanas, Selvam, Navaro, & Leiva, 2012). 
12 Tobin’s Q is measured as the sum of total assets and market value of equity less the book value of 
equity, divided by total assets (Terjesen et al., 2016) 
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2017; Yang et al., 2019). Market measures of performance reflect investors’ 
perception of value of the company and future performance. Accounting measures 
consider past performance predominantly (Gentry & Shen, 2010; Hoskisson, Johnson, 
& Douglas, 1994). Both past and future performance are relevant for understanding 
the impact that female directors have had and will have on a company’s performance. 
Research has shown conflicting results when examining the impact that women board 
members have on market measures. A number of studies showed a positive 
relationship between gender diversity and market performance (Reguera-Alvarado et 
al., 2017; Sabatier, 2015; Sanan, 2016; Terjesen et al., 2016). Conversely, studies by 
Willows and van der Linde (2016) and Yang et al. (2019) showed a negative correlation 
between gender diversity and market performance, whereas Isidro and Sobral (2015) 
and Marinova, Plantenga and Remery (2016) found that women have no effect on 
company value in terms of market measures. 
 
Ryan and Haslam (2005) partly explain the varying correlations between board gender 
diversity and market measures. In some cases, five months before the appointment of 
the female director, companies experienced poor performance compared to the five 
months preceding the appointment of a male director. This phenomenon was labelled 
by Ryan and Haslam (2005) as a “glass cliff”. A ‘glass cliff’ refers to the fact that women 
are more likely to be promoted in a company when the company is in distress or crisis 
(Glass & Cook, 2016). Ryan and Haslam (2016) further explored the glass cliff 
phenomenon through multiple experimental methods. The results of these methods 
showed that when participants wanted to maintain the male-dominant status quo, men 
and women with equal qualifications were equally ranked when companies performed 
well, but women were the preferred leaders in times of poor performance (Ryan et al., 
2016).  
 
Women are promoted to high-risk leadership positions more often than men (Ryan et 
al., 2016), despite literature suggesting that women tend to be more risk-averse than 
men (Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Jianakoplos & Bernasek, 1998; Niederle & Vesterlund, 
2007). When women have been in such high-risk leadership positions, researchers 
found that they lacked the appropriate support from their colleagues and that they had 
their authority questioned, resulting in shorter leadership terms than men (Glass & 
Cook, 2016). Eagly and Johannesen-Schmidt (2001) also noted possible reasons for 
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women having shorter leadership terms than men. They found that, despite poor 
performance, men have remained in leadership positions because of their more 
detached leadership style. This type of leadership may allow men to distance 
themselves from responsibilities that resulted in poor performance. This behaviour is 
consistent with men displaying a self-attribution bias (Minter et al., 2005) and women 
having a stronger negative recall bias (Beyer, 1998), an attribute which may make 
women feel more responsible for poor performance, and result in their being targeted 
as scapegoats. 
 
Lückerath-Rovers (2013) notes that because the board makes strategic decisions to 
maximise company value, company performance as a result of changes in the board 
cannot be measured on a short-term basis. Research remains inconclusive regarding 
the impact of female board representation on financial performance (particularly when 
the results vary depending on the time frame and the measure of financial 
performance used). In addition, existing studies have primarily focused on one type of 
performance, namely financial performance. However, non-financial performance, 
such as governance, social and environmental factors, should also be explored to 
understand the full impact of women board members on company performance. 
  
Board Diversity and Non-financial Performance 
In the past decade, companies have also shifted their focus beyond the ‘bottom line’. 
After the economic recession of 2008/9, stakeholders and regulators called for more 
transparency, accountability and better governance (Ben-Amar & McIlkenny, 2015; 
Reguera-Alvarado et al., 2017; Singh et al., 2008). Companies are now reporting on 
financial targets as well as social and environmental targets (Eccles & Saltzman, 
2011). In September 2015, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development was 
adopted by world leaders. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development includes 
seventeen sustainability goals and relies on government, private sector and civil 
society in order to achieve these (United Nations, 2016). In October 2016, the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) launched the first global standards for sustainability. These 
are voluntary disclosure standards for companies to report on their environmental and 
social impact (Global Reporting Initiative, 2016) highlighting the importance of 




Harjoto, Laksmana and Lee (2015) examined the relationship between Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) performance and board diversity. The study focussed on 
seven measures of diversity, one of which was gender. The results show that gender-
diverse boards perform better in relation to CSR activities and better manage the 
needs of various stakeholders. Alazzani et al. (2017) performed a similar study in 
Malaysia examining gender diversity and social and environmental performances. 
Social and environmental performances were measured on the basis on twelve 
disclosure items13 in the integrated report and whether these measures were met. 
Female directors were found to have a positive influence on social performance but 
there was no demonstrable correlation between gender diversity and environmental 
performance (Alazzani et al., 2017). Similarly, Hoyt (2017) posits that women tend to 
place greater emphasis on social issues than men, owing to differences in their value 
systems, since women tend to focus more on the well-being of others. Nielsen and 
Huse (2010) suggest that the leadership style of women, combined with women’s 
attention and consideration for others, may lead to women being particularly sensitive 
towards CSR decisions. 
 
Nadeem et al. (2017) investigated the impact of gender diverse boards in relation to 
corporate sustainability practices of listed Australian companies between 2010 and 
2014. CSR was measured using the Bloomberg sustainability Environmental, Social 
and Governance (ESG) score which is a measurement of disclosure based on the GRI 
standards. Men and women were shown to differ in their sustainability values. 
Furthermore, the presence of women on a board positively influenced corporate 
sustainability. Yasser et al. (2017) explored the impact of female directors on CSR in 
three emerging markets (Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand) and the results of these 
studies were consistent in showing that female directors improve CSR performance. 
 
                                                          
13 The twelve disclosure items noted in Alazzani et al. (2017) consisted of social and environmental 
factors. Social factors included community volunteering initiatives by employees, community 
investment projects, donations to non-profit organisations and providing education and training to 
employees. Environmental factors included the company reducing carbon dioxide emissions, reducing 
the company’s impact on climate change and pollution, and recycling and waste reduction projects. 
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The influence of women extends beyond environmental and social matters. Women 
have also been shown to influence corporate governance, attendance and staff 
behaviour (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Dunn, 2012; Konrad et al., 2008; Terjesen et al., 
2016). Adams and Ferreira (2009) found that women contributed to better corporate 
governance and are more likely to hold executives accountable for company 
performance. This finding is consistent with that of Anderson et al. (2011) who noted 
that board diversity increases the monitoring of managerial activities. Also, women 
have been shown to influence positively the behaviour of men on the board. Women 
tend to have better attendance records than men and, thus, men have better 
attendance records when women are on the board. As such, women not only hold 
management personnel more accountable for their performance, but they also 
enhance board performance by improving attendance and facilitating decision-making 
(Adams & Ferreira, 2009).  
 
Women are also shown to have an influence on employees. Female directors tend to 
be more appreciative and understanding of their employees. As a result of this display 
of empathy, employees view female directors as more approachable and thus felt able 
to be more open with the board (Konrad et al., 2008). A number of other studies have 
shown that female directors attract and retain female employees at lower levels 
because their presence on the board sends a positive signal for promotion within the 
company (Dunn, 2012; Terjesen et al., 2016). Furlotti, Mazza, Tibiletti and Triani 
(2019) showed that female board members are likely to implement gender diversity 
policies. The nub of the reviewed literature on this theme is that women have been 
shown to have a positive impact on non-financial performance such as CSR, 
sustainability, behaviour in the boardroom and staff morale. 
 
The small, but growing body of literature, as mentioned in this subsection, suggests 
that having women as board members promotes CSR performance as well as 
influencing the effectiveness and behaviour of fellow board members. Limited 
quantitative studies with varying measures of non-financial performance have been 
used in the existing literature to measure the impact of female representation on the 
board. This study aims to use a comparable, quantifiable method to measure the 
impact of female representation on the board on both financial and non-financial 
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performance across multiple countries to add to the growing body of research in this 
field. 
 
Time, Endogeneity and Critical Mass 
Lückerath-Rovers (2013) highlighted three issues which could cause varying results 
in the correlation of female representation on the board with company performance. 
The issues noted were: 1) time, 2) endogeneity and 3) critical mass. Studies on the 
impact of board female representation on company performance have been performed 
at different times, and over different periods and it was noted that shorter periods may 
not give the same results when compared to longer periods because strategic 
decisions may take longer to implement (Lückerath-Rovers, 2013). The second issue 
of causality poses two questions: Are companies performing better or worse because 
of having women on the board, or are better- or poorer-performing companies hiring 
more women? Are there other variables that are correlated with both female 
representation and company performance which have been excluded from the model? 
Lastly, critical mass focuses on the number of women on the board and whether the 
number of women on the board influences the level of impact that they (or, if only one 
woman, she) may have.  
 
Time 
The time period of a study can be explained either over the years the study took place, 
or the length of the study being the number of years used in the study. As is seen in 
the literature review, both factors can cause varying results between the impact of 
female representation on the board and company performance. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the economic recession of 2008/9 saw stakeholders call for 
better corporate governance practices (Ben-Amar & McIlkenny, 2015; Reguera-
Alvarado et al., 2017; Singh et al., 2008). Gender diversity on the board is considered 
to be a good corporate governance practice (Institute of Directors of South Africa, 
2009). Prior to the economic recession, seven countries had either legislated gender 
quotas or recommended governance practices, whereas post-recession, this number 
grew to 25 countries by 2015 (Terjesen, Aguilera, & Lorenz, 2015). A number of 
studies have used data in the period prior to the economic recession of 2008/9 (Adams 
& Ferreira, 2009; Lückerath-Rovers, 2013; Marinova et al., 2016), time periods over 
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the economic recession between 2008 and 2012 (Kılıç & Kuzey, 2016; Sabatier, 2015; 
Sanan, 2016) and periods post-recession between 2010 and 2015 (Nadeem et al., 
2017; Sanan, 2016; Willows & van der Linde, 2016). The time period used in the 
studies may influence measures of profitability (during and outside the recession 
period) and the level of female representation on the board (prior and post-recession 
period), and thus may contribute to mixed results. 
 
Time period lengths commonly used in existing studies range from a single year 
(Alazzani et al., 2017; Marinova et al., 2016; Willows & van der Linde, 2016), three 
years (Isidro & Sobral, 2015; Lückerath-Rovers, 2012) and five years (Gordini & 
Rancati, 2017; Sabatier, 2015) which may contribute to the varying results acquired 
for the impact of female representation on the company’s board on financial 
performance. Ryan and Haslam (2005) suggests the financial performance of a 
company shortly after a board appointment is more likely to be indicative of 
shareholder confidence in the director’s appointment rather than the impact of the 
board member him/herself. Legislative measures that promote board gender diversity 
generally include quotas (33%-50% female representation on the board) and time 
periods (3 – 5 years) (Terjesen et al., 2015). The average board tenure for women 
was reduced from five years in 2015 to four years in 2016 (Kukomnik, 2017). Thus, 
studies with shorter periods may not sufficiently incorporate the impact that female 
representation on the company’s board may have on long-term strategic decisions 
(Lückerath-Rovers, 2013).  
 
Time periods during which the studies took place and the length of the study provides 
a possible explanation for the disparate results. Shorter periods omit the effects of 
long-term projects and decisions made by the board, and thus longer periods are 
required to fully understand the impact on company performance of female 
representation on the board. Economic conditions, such as the economic recession of 
2008/9, not only impacts company performance but also serves as a catalyst for 
change in governance practices. More recent studies are needed to better reflect the 





Endogeneity arises in two forms. The first is when there is a correlation between the 
independent variable and the error term in the model (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009). 
Stated differently, there is endogeneity in a model when a variable that is correlated 
with the dependent variable and independent variable has been omitted from the 
model. Secondly, reverse causality may lead to the dependent variable having an 
impact on the independent variable rather than vice versa (Sila, Gonzalez, & 
Hagendorff, 2016).   
 
A number of studies have raised the concern of endogeneity in the context of female 
representation on the board and company performance (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; 
Joecks et al., 2013; Lückerath-Rovers, 2013; Nadeem et al., 2017; Ntim, 2013; 
Sabatier, 2015; Yang et al., 2019). There are disputes as to whether companies 
perform well because of gender diversity in the boardroom, or whether high-
performance firms are more likely to hire female directors. Kakabadse et al. (2015) 
expanded the observation made by Baysinger and Butler (1985) that in order to appear 
progressive, top-performing companies may hire a female or females and appoint 
them to the board. Similarly, Ryan and Haslam (2005) noted that a woman is more 
likely to be promoted in times of poor performance, thus, further contributing to the 
concern regarding causality. 
 
Sila et al. (2016) suggest that the issue of reverse causality is dynamic: current female 
representation is influenced by past company decisions and performance. To explore 
if endogeneity exists based on past performance, Sila et al. (2016) conducted a Probit 
test. The objective of the Probit test is to determine whether past risk influences the 
company’s appointment of new female directors. The results of the Probit test showed 
that the probability of past risk impacting female representation on the board (i.e. the 
effects of reverse causality) is small and only suggestive of endogeneity. Using the 
same method, Lu and Herremans (2019) tested whether past environmental 
performance influences the probability of appointing a new female director. The results 
of this study showed that past environmental performance has no impact on the 
appointment of female directors. Thus, although dynamic endogeneity may exist, the 




Several studies have controlled for endogeneity (Nadeem et al., 2017; Ntim, 2013; 
Sabatier, 2015) and still found a positive relationship between board gender diversity 
and company performance. However, a Norwegian study found a negative relationship 
between gender diversity and company performance after controlling for endogeneity 
(Yang et al., 2019). Thus, the literature reviewed is inconclusive regarding causality 
between gender diversity on the board and company performance. 
 
Critical Mass 
Critical mass and female representation have been widely explored in existing 
literature. The topic was introduced as early as 1998 when Dolan and Ford (1998) 
noted that women act more distinctively once a certain threshold has been reached. 
Thus, the topic of critical mass is relevant when assessing the impact of women on 
company performance because it may influence the behaviour of the women on the 
board. 
 
A large number of studies measured gender diversity with a binary variable; whether 
there was at least one female director or no female directors (Alazzani et al., 2017; 
Green & Homroy, 2018; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2016; Marinova et al., 2016; Nadeem et al., 
2017; Wachudi & Mboya, 2012) because most companies were found to only have 
one female director (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Lückerath-Rovers, 2013). However, 
some studies suggest that greater value is added to company performance when there 
is more than one woman on the board. 
 
Konrad et al. (2008) interviewed 50 female directors from Fortune 1000 companies as 
well as a number of their male counterparts. Based on these interviews regarding 
board dynamics, the presence of only one woman on a board was considered to be a 
token. Consequently, her opinions were largely ignored, her views were perceived as 
stereotypical and representative of all women, and not based on the female director’s 
individual skills and observations. The perception of female representation in the 
boardroom was that it is a superficial act to please shareholders who called for gender 
diversity. Women who wanted to be taken seriously had to fight for their voices to be 
heard. Kakabadse et al. (2015) confirmed that participants who were the only woman 




The presence of two women on a board increased the feelings of inclusion but the 
effects of tokenism and the stereotypical perception of women were merely reduced 
but not eliminated. Three women in the boardroom removed the barriers that were 
experienced by just one or two women (Konrad et al., 2008). With three women in the 
boardroom, women were accepted, were more active in the discussion and were more 
likely to be heard. It becomes harder for men to stereotype the views of women when 
each of the women present different opinions from one another (Konrad et al., 2008). 
The presence of more women on a board created a more comfortable space for female 
directors to voice their views because it becomes more difficult for men to ignore a 
larger proportion of the board (Kakabadse et al., 2015). The presence of three women 
made a significant contribution to boardroom effectiveness and collaboration (Konrad 
et al., 2008). Konrad et al. (2008) and Torchia, Calabrò and Huse (2011) concluded 
that one woman is enough to make a difference, but companies with at least three 
women on the board benefit the most from their contribution.  
 
Few studies have explored the impact of critical mass on company performance. 
Some studies examined whether a board had 30% or more female directors (Isidro & 
Sobral, 2015; Joecks et al., 2013) whereas others examined whether there were three 
or more female directors (Sabatier, 2015; Willows & van der Linde, 2016). When using 
the proportion of 30% female directors to examine the impact of critical mass in relation 
to firm performance, there were mixed results. Either there was no correlation (Isidro 
& Sobral, 2015) or a positive relationship to firm performance (Joecks et al., 2013). 
Joecks et al. (2013) further noted that 30% of the female directors approximated three 
female directors. When using the absolute number of three or more female directors, 
there was a stronger positive relationship with firm performance in terms of accounting 
measures (Joecks et al., 2013; Willows & van der Linde, 2016) and a weaker negative 
relationship with market measures (Willows & van der Linde, 2016). Sabatier (2015) 
found no indication of tokenism when companies in the sample had three or more 
female directors. 
 
Thus, research has shown that critical mass is a relevant consideration when seeking 
to understand the impact of women on company performance. Existing studies have 
incorporated different measurements for critical mass, however, a large body of 




Time, causality and critical mass are all relevant factors when considering the impact 
of female representation. Research suggests that the time period and the length of the 
study may contribute to the mixed results. Further, research has shown to be 
inconclusive regarding causality. Conversely, research suggests that three women is 
an appropriate threshold for critical mass when observing the impact on company 
performance of the presence of women on the board. Research has further highlighted 
factors that may accelerate or hinder companies from reaching critical mass. These 
factors have shown to be driven by the social culture and regulatory environment of 
the country in which the company is situated.  
 
Quotas, Culture and Country Variables 
Cultural norms and societal expectations in different countries have been shown to 
influence the impact on the company performance of women on the board (Kakabadse 
et al., 2015; Low et al., 2015). The literature shows that factors such as workforce 
participation (Terjesen et al., 2016), the institutional environment (Terjesen & Singh, 
2008) and gender quotas (Yang et al., 2019) influence the number of female directors 
and their impact on company performance. 
 
Kakabadse et al. (2015) explored the impact of gender diversity on the board across 
three countries (United Kingdom, United States of America and Ghana) on the basis 
that each country had different gender-related development scores. The researcher 
interviewed ten female directors from each country to explore the impact of women on 
the board. However, the aim of the study was not to draw comparisons between the 
countries but rather to include a diverse sample. Terjesen et al. (2016) explored the 
relationship between gender diversity and firm performance across 47 countries, 
including a range of developed and developing markets for a diverse sample. Control 
variables were used to account for these differences between markets because 
developed markets may have more advanced corporate governance practices; 
however, no comparisons between countries were drawn. Thus, little to no research 
has presented a cross-country comparison. Existing literature using multiple countries 





Byron and Post (2016) posit that the reason for the previously noted varying results of 
the impact on company performance of female representation on the board is that the 
studies are based on a single country and, thus, country-level factors influence the 
extent that their presence may have on company performance. Macro-environmental 
factors that influence the relationship between governance and performance can only 
be explained through cross-country studies. Post and Byron (2015) and Byron and 
Post (2016) used a meta-analysis to explore the influence of country-level factors (in 
the form of shareholder protections14 and gender parity) on the correlation between 
female board members and company performance. The results showed that there was 
no relationship between shareholder protection and gender parity on the impact of 
female board members on financial performance. Conversely, a stronger positive 
relationship was observed between women on the board and CSR performance in 
countries with higher shareholder protections and higher gender parity.  
Although research has identified that country factors may influence the impact on 
company performance of female representation on the board, very few of the studies 
in the reviewed literature have explored a cross-country comparison to evaluate the 
country-level impact that may contribute to the conflicting results noted in the previous 
paragraph. Thus, this study aims to address the gap in the literature by performing a 
cross-country comparison, using quantitative methods, to explore the impact of female 
board members on the company’s financial and non-financial performance. 
 
Nonetheless, a number of studies have examined the relationship between women in 
the workforce and cultural norms. Rodriguez-Kiino (2018) explored the experiences of 
sixteen women in the Japanese workforce. The study highlighted these women as 
having experienced barriers and familial discouragement to pursue higher education. 
The expectation of the majority of Japanese women is to maintain the household and 
provide childcare rather than participate in the workforce (Low et al., 2015; Rodriguez-
Kiino, 2018). Mukherjee (2015) showed that despite the increase in education, there 
was still a lack of participation by women in the Chinese, Japanese and Indian labour 
force owing to the gender norms practised in these countries. This lack of female 
                                                          
14 Shareholder protections include the transparency of related party investments, liability for directors 
for breach of fiduciary duties and the ease at which shareholders can hold directors liable for 
misconduct (Byron & Post, 2016). 
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participation in the workforce is not unique to the South and East Asian markets. 
Khoudja and Platt (2018) explored the entries and exits of women of different 
ethnicities to and from the labour force in the United Kingdom. Participation varied 
between ethnicities and highlights that even within the same labour market, cultural 
differences influence the participation of women in the workforce.  
 
Although an increase in education in some nations may not translate into female 
participation in the labour force, this is not the case for all nations. Heath and 
Jayachandran (2018) examined the relationship between female education and work 
force participation in developing nations. The study showed that gender parity in terms 
of the education of women in less developed nations is lower than that of developed 
nations. However, the study further showed that as these developing nations start to 
grow, education for both genders increases, but female education rises faster than 
male education (and thus starts to move towards equal education for men and 
women). The study further demonstrates that an increase in female education results 
in an increase in female participation. However, like Mukherjee (2015), Heath and 
Jayachandran (2018) note that not all developing nations, for example Pakistan and 
Malawi, experience the positive correlation between education and workforce 
participation.  
 
Some countries have introduced quotas to increase the participation of women in the 
workforce. Gender quotas are mechanisms imposed on companies predominantly to 
meet a particular level of female representation. Terjesen, Aguilera and Lorenz (2015) 
examined the driving factors behind gender quotas on a board. Countries with a history 
of gender inequality, structures to promote gender equality in the workplace and left-
wing political participation were more likely to have gender quotas for boards. Ten 
countries have legislated mandatory gender quotas and fifteen have corporate 
governance codes that promote gender diversity at a board level (Terjesen et al., 
2015). Countries with the highest level of board gender diversity such as Norway 
(42%), Sweden (28%) and Finland (27.2%) all have mandatory gender quotas. 
Conversely, countries with lower gender diversity levels such as Morocco (0%), Japan 
(0.9%) and Chile (2.4%) do not have any policies to promote gender diversity 
(Terjesen et al., 2015). These figures suggest that gender quotas are effective in 




Although gender quotas are used to promote gender equality in the workforce, gender 
quotas are not always received positively. Quotas are viewed as delegitimising the 
merits of the female directors and limiting the board’s ability to choose directors based 
on the skills required (Adriaanse, 2017; Kakabadse et al., 2015). Some research 
suggests that resistance towards gender quotas originates from the desire to reduce 
the participation of women in leadership positions (Forstenlechner, Lettice, & Özbilgin, 
2012; Sayce & Özbilgin, 2014). Despite the varying views on gender quotas, they are 
shown to be an effective method for increasing gender diversity over time (Adriaanse, 
2017; Grosvold, Brammer, & Rayton, 2007; Yang et al., 2019). 
 
Consequently, there are a number of varying factors highlighted in this subsection that 
need to be considered when understanding women’s participation in the workforce 
and the challenges that women face to gain access to senior levels of management. 
Challenges range from societal expectations and unpaid obligations to stigmas around 
the use of quotas. Access by women to education continues to be a focus to increase 
workforce participation, however, cultural barriers persist. Thus, differences exist 
between nations in terms of gender parity in the workforce and these differences 
influence the availability of women who are eligible to be on the board of directors. 
 
Current Position of Women on the Board  
Although female representation on boards is increasing, women remain under-
represented. The percentage of women on the board has increased globally from 
15.8% in 2016 to 17.3% in 2017 (Catalyst, 2018). Farrell and Hersch (2005) showed 
that if a woman resigned or retired from a board, the likelihood of the appointment of 
another woman to replace her is 39%. However, if a man resigned, the likelihood of 
appointing a woman was only 13%. These statistics contribute to the delayed progress 
to reach gender diversity targets. Catalyst (2018) revealed that if there is a female 
chairman, the board has twice as many female directors as those with a male 
chairman. Female directors are more likely to implement and support initiatives to 
promote women in the workplace (Konrad et al., 2008) and create a female-friendly 




Women continue to hold more non-executive positions than executive positions 
(Broadbent, 2016; Lückerath-Rovers, 2013). Lückerath-Rovers’s (2013) study showed 
that although females made up 5% of all directors on the board, females made up 
2.1% of all executive directors and 6.9% of non-executive directors for 99 listed Dutch 
companies. Willows and van der Linde (2016) noted that for 40 South African 
companies, 18.78% of directors were women and 90% of these women were non-
executive directors. 
 
The tendency to hire women for non-executive positions could possibly be explained 
by the function and structure of board committees as well as the unique skills of 
women. Board committees are structures created to perform specific tasks on behalf 
of the board (Guo & Masulis, 2015) such as monitoring risk, remuneration and board 
appointments. Board committee members should have the necessary skills to perform 
the function of that committee. These committees may also have different composition 
requirements as between executive and non-executive directors to ensure the 
appropriate level of corporate governance (Institute of Directors of South Africa, 2009). 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) found that women are more likely to be appointed to 
monitoring committees rather than remuneration committees. Boards with more 
women have shown to outperform male-dominated boards in relation to audit, risk and 
oversight (Brown, Brown, & Anastasopoulos, 2002), suggesting that women possess 
the necessary skills to serve on monitoring committees. The audit and risk committees 
should consist largely of independent non-executive directors (Institute of Directors of 
South Africa, 2009) and this requirement could explain why women are mostly 
appointed as non-executive directors. 
 
Kang, Ding and Charoenwong (2010) demonstrated that the market reaction to the 
appointment of a female director is generally positive. However, the market reaction 
is less positive when a woman is appointed to an executive position. Lee and James 
(2007) posit that female CEOs are more likely to be adversely affected by detrimental 
gender stereotypes and perception biases. Further, the under-representation of 
women in executive positions reinforces the stereotypes that men are more qualified 
for executive roles. Careful consideration of the potential risks associated with 
executive female appointments is necessary, and succession planning and 
communication need to be in place to offset the anticipated market reaction (Lee & 
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James, 2007). Thus, the adverse market reactions and stereotypical labelling faced 
by women may limit the number of women appointed to executive positions. 
 
Representation of women is also shown to be concentrated in certain industries. 
Women are largely appointed in Consumer Goods or Financial Services rather than 
Industrial and Basic Materials (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Grosvold et al., 2007; Joecks 
et al., 2013). The industry sector has been shown to influence the gender composition 
of the board; historically, male-dominated sectors have been demonstrated to have 
the lowest level of female representation on the board (Grosvold et al., 2007; Skaggs, 
Stainback, & Duncan, 2012).  Similarly, the findings of Brammer et al. (2009) prove 
that women prefer sectors that interact with the final/female consumer rather than 
sectors that are male-dominated, such as construction and engineering. This fact may 
be linked to the stereotypes that women face in leadership positions (Hoyt, 2017) 
which drives them to choose sectors that are less male-dominated. Skaggs et al. 
(2012) posit that until women occupy both managerial and non-managerial positions 
in under-represented industries, board opportunities for women in these industries 
remain scarce.  
 
Currently, women still remain under-represented on the board of directors of the 
majority of companies. Women are shown mostly to occupy non-executive positions 
and female representation tends to be concentrated to certain sectors. Male-dominant 
sectors tend to have a lower representation of women on the board compared to other 
sectors. Women’s presence on the board is likely to promote the advancement of 
women in the workplace and, thus, companies should continue to work towards 
achieving gender diversity on their boards.  
 
Conclusion 
Research delineated in the literature review has highlighted the importance of gender 
diversity on decision-making and the influence that women have on various aspects 
of a company. However, these research results are inconclusive as to whether women 
have a causal impact on company performance. The variation in results is owing to 
factors such as the time period, cultural norms and stereotypes, critical mass, gender 
quotas and the economic participation of women that have impacted such research 
projects. This study aims to shed light on the gaps identified in the literature review by 
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performing a multi-country study with a cross-country comparison of the impact that 







The literature review delineated in the previous chapter showed that, while several 
studies have explored the impact of gender diversity on company performance, the 
results are mixed. The studies were focused largely on financial performance in a 
single country. Those studies that considered multiple countries focused on the 
European region. Gender parity, economic participation and education across different 
counties were factors contributing to the mixed results. Furthermore, limited research 
assessed the impact of gender diversity on non-financial performance, such as a 
company’s contribution to society, the environment and the implementation of 
sustainable business practices. Consequently, the objective of this research is to 
explore a cross-country comparison of the impact of gender diversity in the board of 
directors on companies’ financial and non-financial performance. The three countries 
selected for the cross-company comparison have different economic markets, cultural 
norms, as well as potential for female educational attainment, economic participation 
and opportunity. Further justification for the selection of these countries is included 
under the “Sample Selection” section further below. 
 
The research questions posed in this study are as follows: 
1. Do women on a company’s board of directors positively impact the company’s 
financial performance in terms of accounting and/or market measures? 
2. Do women on a company’s board of directors positively impact non-financial 
performance in terms of environmental and social impact? 
3. Does the impact of women on the board on a company’s financial and non-
financial performance vary in countries with different economic environments, 
gender parity and cultural norms? 
 
The null hypotheses (H0) are that female representation has no positive impact on a 
company’s financial position (measured in terms of accounting or market measures), 
social and environmental performance, and that country-level factors have no 
influence on the impact that women on the board have on a company’s performance. 
The alternative hypotheses (H1) are that female representation positively impacts a 
company’s financial, social and environmental performance and that the country-level 
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factors do influence the impact that women on the board have on company 
performance. 
 
In order to answer the above research questions, female representation (as measured 
by the percentage of women on the board and critical mass being three women15) will 
be assessed against the ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q for financial performance of the 
company. Female representation will also be assessed against the company’s 
environmental and social performance (as measured by the environmental and social 
pillar score determined by Refinitiv16). Interaction terms between the percentage of 
women on the board and critical mass with a country variable, will be created and 
evaluated to determine the influence of country-level factors on the impact of women 




The countries selected for the cross-country comparison are Australia, Japan and 
South Africa. These countries were selected because each country has different 
economic and cultural landscapes (World Economic Situation and Prospects, 2014), 
regulated gender quotas (Terjesen et al., 2015) and levels of gender parity (World 
Economic Forum, 2018a). Further, these countries permit the use of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for listed companies (The IFRS Foundation, 
2017) and provide annual reports in English. Uniform reporting standards are 
necessary to ensure a consistent measure of accounting performance because 
accounting treatments and presentation of financial results may differ between 
standards. 
 
The Global Gender Gap Report (GGGR) was used to select the three countries for 
comparison. This method is similar to the approach used by Kakabadse et al. (2015) 
to examine countries that had varying levels of gender inequality as per the Gender 
                                                          
15 The justification for using three women as critical mass is included under the “Independent 
Variables” section below. 




Related Development Index. The GGGR measures four areas of gender inequality 
across 149 countries: 1) Economic Participation and Opportunity, 2) Educational 
Attainment, 3) Health and Survival and 4) Political Empowerment. For the purpose of 
this study, two of the categories, namely Economic Participation and Opportunity, and 
Educational Attainment, were most appropriate. These areas are relevant to the 
outcome of female representation at a board level. The categories of Economic 
Participation and Opportunity reflects the ratio of women in the labour force, the 
remuneration gap between men and women, the ratio of men and women in 
management and the ratio of female professional workers. The second measure, 
Educational Attainment, measures the access to education and literacy rates of 
women compared to men. Board members are required to possess the necessary 
skills to fulfil their role. These skills include knowledge of the specific industry, technical 
and specialist knowledge in their area of expertise and an understanding of 
governance practices (Australian Institute of Company Directors, 2017). In order to 
obtain these skills, board members need to have sufficient education and work 
experience to qualify for a position as a director, thus making Educational Attainment 
and Economic Participation, and Opportunity the most relevant categories. 
 
The GGGR allocates a score to each country based on the criteria within each 
category. These scores range between 0 and 1, with 1 being the highest attainable 
score. The countries are then ranked from 1 to 149 depending on their score for each 
category. The most recent GGGR figures available are for 2018. 
 
Between Australia, Japan and South Africa, Australia is ranked the highest with a rank 
of 1 (score of 1) for Educational Attainment and 46 (score of 0.718) for Economic 
Participation and Opportunity. South Africa falls somewhere in the middle, with a rank 
of 72 (score of 0.992) for Educational Attainment and 91 for Economic Participation 
and Opportunity (score of 0.645). Japan is ranked very low for Economic Participation 
and Opportunity with a rank of 117 (score of 0.595). However, Japan is ranked closer 
to the median for Educational Attainment with a rank of 65 (score of 0.994).  
 
In addition to gender parity, differences in economic environments have also been 
noted between these three countries. Australia and Japan are developed markets, 
whereas South Africa is an emerging market (World Economic Situation and 
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Prospects, 2014). Both Australia and South Africa have recommended gender quotas 
for a company’s board of directors, whereas Japan does not (Terjesen et al., 2015). 
Thus, a cross-country analysis between these three countries is appropriate for the 
objectives of this research study. 
 
The top 100 companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), and the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), as at 31 
December 2018, were selected. The necessary information was then obtained for 
these 300 companies (the sample companies) for the three years from 2016 and 2018 
(the sample period). A period of three years was used due to limited ESG data in 
earlier years and in order to assess the most recent financial data. The average board 
tenure for women was four years in 2016 (Kukomnik, 2017) and quota periods for 
women generally range between three and five years (Terjesen et al., 2015). Thus, a 
three-year period is considered sufficient to assess the short and long-term impact of 




Financial information such as ROE, ROA, Tobin’s Q, Total Assets and Leverage was 
obtained from Bloomberg17. All information was captured in US Dollars (USD) for 
comparability across different reporting currencies. Three reporting frameworks are 
used amongst the 300 sample companies: IFRS, US GAAP18 and Japanese GAAP 
(JP GAAP). IFRS is used in South Africa and Australia. Two Australian companies 
have chosen to report in US GAAP as they are dual-listed in the United States. 
Japanese companies have the option of using any one of the three financial reporting 
frameworks. Of the Japanese companies, 41% of the sample use IFRS, 12% use US 
GAAP and 47% used Japanese GAAP. Thus, a control variable will be used in the 
testing to control for differences in reporting frameworks. Non-financial information, 
such as the Refinitiv Environmental and Social scores, were obtained from 
Datastream19.  
                                                          
17 Bloomberg is a technology provider of financial data, news and information (Bloomberg, 2019). 
18 GAAP stands for Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. 




Board composition information was collected from Bloomberg (2019) and individual 
company annual reports. Random spot checks were performed on the information 
obtained from Bloomberg and the annual reports to ensure consistency. Where any 
differences were noted, only the information from the annual report was used for that 
instance. Limited differences were noted between Bloomberg (2019) and the individual 
companies’ annual report. 
 
The company sectors were determined using the Industry Classification Benchmark 
(ICB) and the industry sector coding obtained from Bloomberg. The sectors were 
simplified into the following three sectors: Financials, Industrials and Resources (The 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 2018).  
 
Data cleaning 
The initial sample of 300 companies was reduced by two companies that were dual- 
listed on the ASX and the JSE to avoid double-counting these companies. The sample 
was further reduced by companies that had missing information, non-recurring items20 
or information that could not be relied upon owing to restatements of the financial 
statements in any year for the sampled period. The final sample comprises 294 
companies over three years resulting in 86321 individual data points. Appendix A 
includes a list of these 294 companies.  
 
                                                          
20 Non-recurring items refers to any once-off transactions that occurred during the year which are not 
related to normal business (Li, Su, Dong, & Zhu, 2018). For the sample selected, these transactions 
include, inter alia, profits from a discontinued operation and profits that arise from a deemed sale of 
an associate which became a subsidiary during the year. 
 
21 Companies with either missing information, non-recurring items or information that cannot be relied 
on due to restatements were excluded only for the year in which those anomalies were noted i.e.: a 






The most common measures of financial performance noted in the literature review 
were ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Isidro & Sobral, 2015; Kılıç 
& Kuzey, 2016; Sabatier, 2015; Sanan, 2016; Willows & van der Linde, 2016). The 
former two measures are accounting measures and the latter is a market measure. 
These same three measures of financial performance were chosen for consistency 
and comparability to previous studies and, thus, their ability to reliably measure 
company performance. 
 
Although ROA and ROE are both accounting measures of profitability, each ratio 
measures a different aspect of performance. ROE measures the profit or return a 
company makes for its shareholders. ROA measures how efficiently a company is 
using its asset base to generate profit (Correia, 2019). The main difference between 
the two measures is leverage. The more financially leveraged a company is, the more 
funds it has to acquire assets without using shareholder funds. Profits generated from 
debt-funded assets may result in a higher ROE (but not necessarily a higher ROA) 
and with increased risk as a result of being more leveraged (Correia, 2019).  
Large capital expenditures in one year may also result in a significantly lower ROA 
compared to ROE. New assets may not have started generating income at the time of 
measurement. Thus, an increase in the asset base with no increase in profitability 
results in a lower ROA value. Conversely, older and depreciated assets may have very 
low book values, resulting in higher ROA values compared to ROE (Correia, 2019).  
 
Certain ratios may highlight strong points of company performance whereas others 
may highlight weaker points (Correia, 2019). Owing to the limitations of ratio analysis, 
several different ratios are required to understand company performance as a whole. 
In addition, although accounting measures and market measures are both measures 
of performance, the measures may not be related owing to conflicts between achieving 
short-term and long-terms goals (Gentry & Shen, 2010). Rowe and Morrow (1999) 
suggest that using both market and accounting measures increases measurement 




Non-financial performance is generally measured in relation to the governance 
practices, social and environmental performance of the company. Two measures are 
used in this study: an Environmental Score and a Social Score22. The Environmental 
and Social Pillar Scores for each country are determined by Refinitiv. Refinitiv takes 
public information and assigns a score based on 178 Environmental, Social and 
Governance factors. Refinitiv assigns an individual score to each Pillar and then 
equally weights these scores to determine the overall Environmental, Social, and 
Governance (ESG) score (which ranges from D- to A+).  
 
The Environmental Score is evaluated on three broad categories: 1) reducing the use 
of natural resources, 2) reducing the release of environmental emissions and 
implementing recycling practices, and 3) innovative ways to reduce the company’s 
consumer impact on the environment through eco-designed products. The Social 
Score is evaluated on four broad categories: 1) satisfaction, health, safety and equal 
opportunity of the company’s workforce, 2) respecting fundamental human rights 3) 
provision of quality goods and services to customers ensuring their health, safety and 
privacy protection, and 4) being a good corporate citizen, protecting public health and 
practicing good business ethics (Refinitiv, 2019). The scores ranging from D- to A+ 
are recoded from 1 to 12, with 1 being D- and 12 being A+ to form continuous 
variables. This method is similar to that of Nadeem et al. (2017) who used the 
Bloomberg ESG score to measure corporate sustainability practices. 
 
Independent Variables  
Gender diversity is primarily measured as the percentage of female directors on the 
company’s board of directors. A large body of the reviewed literature measured gender 
diversity based on whether or not there is at least one female director (Gordini & 
Rancati, 2017; Green & Homroy, 2018; Joecks et al., 2013; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2016; 
                                                          
22 The ESG Score is combination of three pillars which determines the overall score, namely 1) 
Environmental, 2) Social and 3) Governance pillars. Gender diversity at a board level is one of the 
governance factors used to determine the Governance Pillar score. Thus, it is inappropriate to use 
this pillar in the independent variable, because the independent variable of interest to this study is 
female representation on boards i.e. gender diversity.  Therefore, only the individual Environmental 
and Social Pillar scores are used (Refinitiv, 2019). 
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Nadeem et al., 2017). Because 84% of the sample companies in this study had at 
least one female director, this method was not considered appropriate as a measure 
of gender diversity. Thus, the percentage of female directors was chosen as a 
preferable measure, as used by Alazzani et al. (2017), Gordini and Rancati (2017) and 
Marinova et al. (2016).  
 
An additional binary variable is created to indicate whether there are three or more 
female directors on the company’s board of directors. This is the “critical mass” 
referenced previously in the Literature Review. Konrad et al. (2008) show that 




The relationship between company performance and female representation 
(percentage of women on the board and critical mass) is dependent on the country in 
which the specific sample company is situated. Thus, in order to test the third research 
question, interaction terms between the independent variables and the categorical 
country variables are created.  
 
Control Variables 
In order to control for various other factors in a company which may affect financial 
and non-financial performance and female representation on boards, the following 
control variables are included in the testing: 
 The sector in which the company operates. Female representation tends to be 
more concentrated in Consumer Goods and Financial Services (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009; Grosvold et al., 2007; Joecks et al., 2013). Thus, the sector may 
impact the number of women on the board. Further, the nature of the sector 
may influence the performance measures because industries have different 
sector averages for performance ratios (Kharatyan, Lopes, & Nunes, 2017). 
 The country in which the company operates (Byron & Post, 2016; Kakabadse 
et al., 2015). Country specific conditions, such as economic participation, 
educational advancement and gender quotas for board composition, may 
influence the results. The economic environment of the country may also 
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influence the profitability and performance measures of the company. 
Favourable market conditions allow for economic growth (Peric & Vitezic, 2016) 
and unfavourable conditions severely affect profitability (Rollins, Nickell, & 
Ennis, 2014). 
 Financial Reporting Framework. A categorical variable is used to control for 
differences in reporting frameworks.  
 The size of the company. Size is usually a determinant for company 
performance (Isidro & Sobral, 2015). The natural log of total assets is used to 
control for size (Isidro & Sobral, 2015; Kılıç & Kuzey, 2016; Lückerath-Rovers, 
2012).  
 Leverage. The more leveraged a company is, the more risk it carries and the 
closer it may be to breaching covenants (Abdullah, 2014). Consistent with Kılıç 
and Kuzey (2016) and Gulzar et al. (2019), leverage is measured as total debt 
over total assets.  
 The size of the board. The size of the board may affect the impact of gender 
diversity (Grosvold et al., 2007) or company performance (Arulvel & 
Pratheepkanth, 2019; Azeez, 2015). Board size is measured as the total 
number of board members (Gulzar et al., 2019; Liao et al., 2018; Sanan, 2016). 
 
The Table in Appendix B below summarises each of the variables to be used in the 
testing undertaken in this research study. 
 
Research Method 
As a starting point, descriptive statistics are set out for all continuous variables to 
understand the current environment of women on the board of directors. In addition, 
an analysis of female representation per country and per sector will be assessed by 
measuring the mean percentage of women for each year in the sample period.  
 
A linear mixed regression is used to assess the impact of female board members on 
company performance. The data consists of panel data with multiple observations for 
the same individual (i.e. each sample company) at various points in time i.e. 
longitudinal data. The longitudinal data is considered to be multilevel data. Level 1 
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represents the repeated measures each year. Level 2 represents the unit of analysis, 
being the company.  
 
The data displays both fixed and random factors. Fixed factors are categorical 
variables that are chosen to present specific conditions that are of interest viz. the 
country. Random factors are variables which are randomly sampled from an entire 
population viz. individual companies. Not all random factors are present in the data 
because it is only a sample from the larger population. However, the results of the 
analysis of random factors are used to make inferences about the entire population. 
Both fixed and random factors are present in the data and, therefore, both fixed and 
random effects need to be present in the model (West, Welch, & Galecki, 2007). 
 
Fixed effects, namely the regression coefficients, explain the relationship between the 
dependent variable and independent variable (West et al., 2007). Fixed effects control 
for all time-invariant variables (country, sector and financial reporting framework) to 
estimate changes within an individual and eliminate bias from any omitted time–
invariant variables (Kohler & Kreuter, 2009). Therefore, fixed effects assume that each 
individual (company) is functionally identical (Borenstein, Higgins, & Rothsiein, 2009) 
and consequently fixes the intercept and the slope of the model. 
 
Random effects are random values in the model applied to a random factor (West et 
al., 2007). Random effects allow for individual effects, such as time-invariant variables, 
to be explanatory variables and to influence the dependent variable. Random effects 
can either be included as random intercepts or random slopes (coefficients). Random 
intercepts represent random deviations for an individual from the fixed intercept (West 
et al., 2007). Random slopes allow for the expected change in the dependent variable 
for one unit of the independent variable to differ per company. Thus, random intercepts 
and random slopes allow for each company to form a unique relationship between the 
dependent and independent variable (Pillinger, 2019).  
 
Individual companies are considered levels of the random factor company by design 
because they are randomly sampled from a larger population of companies. All levels 
of classification are not present in the dataset and the intention is to make inferences 
about the larger population. As a result, the expectation is that individual companies 
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will deviate from the overall fixed intercept. Therefore, random intercepts are included 
in the model. Further, substantial differences between companies are expected as 
companies in the sample are different sizes, have different policies, and operate in 
different industries and institutional and economic environments. Random slopes 
allow for the explanatory variables to have a different effect for each individual 
company and, therefore are included in the model. The fixed factors are the categorical 
country variables because these countries were specifically chosen to demonstrate 
varying levels of gender parity and differences in cultural norms, (West et al., 2007). 
 
Conventional linear models assume that data points are independent. Owing to the 
fact that the data consists of multiple observations of the same individual company 
over time, data points within an individual company are expected to be correlated, thus 
violating the independence assumption (West et al., 2007). Linear mixed models 
estimate the covariance parameters to incorporate the correlation from the multiple 
observations. The flexibility of the linear mixed model allows for fixed effects, random 
coefficients and random slopes. Thus, the linear mixed model is considered 
appropriate for data collection in this research study. 
 
A linear mixed regression model is repeatedly used to test each performance measure 
(ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Q, Environment Score and Social Score) against the percentage 
of women on the board or against critical mass (independent variables). The 
regression models are repeated, including interaction terms between the country 
variable and the independent variables, to identify whether the impact of women on 
the board on company performance for each performance measure is statistically 
different in Japan and South Africa, compared to Australia, being the reference group 
for the regression analysis. The equations for each model are presented below: 
 
Model 1:  
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑗 + ∑𝛽2−3𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟2−3  +  ∑𝛽4−5𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦2−3 +





𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗  = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑐𝑚𝑖𝑗 + ∑𝛽2−3𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟2−3  + ∑𝛽4−5𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦2−3 +
∑𝛽6−7𝑓𝑟𝑓2−3 + 𝛽8𝑙𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽9𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽10𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢0𝑗 + 𝑢1𝑐𝑚𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗  
 
Model 3: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽0  + 𝛽1𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑗 + ∑𝛽2−3𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟2−3  +  ∑𝛽4−5𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦2−3 +
∑𝛽6−7𝑓𝑟𝑓2−3 + ∑𝛽11−12𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦2−3 + 𝛽8𝑙𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽9𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗 +
𝛽10𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝑢0𝑗 +  𝑢1𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗   
 
Model 4: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽0  + 𝛽1𝑐𝑚𝑖𝑗 +  ∑𝛽2−3𝑠𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟2−3  +  ∑𝛽4−5𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦2−3 +
∑𝛽6−7𝑓𝑟𝑓2−3 + ∑𝛽11−12𝑐𝑚𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦2−3 + 𝛽8𝑙𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽9𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽10𝑏𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑗  +
𝑢0𝑗  + 𝑢1𝑐𝑚𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗    
 
In the equation “𝛽0” represents the regression intercept, “𝛽1−12 ” the regression co-
efficient, “ 𝑢0” represents the random intercept (i.e. the deviation from “𝛽0”), “𝑢1” the 
random co-efficient and “𝜀” represents the error term. The subscripts “𝑖” reflects the 
repeated measures of years, being 1-3 years (2016-2018) and “𝑗” reflects the number 
of individual companies, being 1-294 companies. The remaining variable terms in the 
equation are explained in Appendix B. 
 
Limitations 
Existing literature has posed the question of whether strong company performance 
results in increased female representation on the board, or whether female 
representation on the board increases company performance (Nadeem et al., 2017; 
Sabatier, 2015; Yang et al., 2019). Although this study does not consider endogeneity, 
recent studies have tested the impact of endogeneity between female representation 
and company performance and found there to be little to no impact (Lu & Herremans, 
2019; Sila et al., 2016). Nadeem et al. (2017) and Sabatier (2015) controlled for 
endogeneity and a positive relationship between female representation on the board 
and company performance remained constant. Thus, despite this study lacking a 
consideration of endogeneity, the existing literature review has shown that its impact 




Another limitation to this research study is the lack of uniform accounting standards. 
Uniform accounting standards strengthen the comparability of the accounting 
performance measures because it ensures consistent presentation of financial 
information across the companies. Although the use of uniform accounting standards 
is not present in the sample, 79% of the total sample uses IFRS and differences in 







The descriptive statistics begin with a presentation of summary statistics for all 
continuous variables over the three-year sample period. The summary statistics will 
show the minimum, mean, median, maximum and standard deviation of all variables. 
Following that, the correlation results and regression results will be presented. Table 
1 starts with the summary statistics of all the continuous variables. 
Table 1: Summary statistics of all continuous variables over the three-year sample 
period. 
Variable Name Min Mean Median Max Std Dev. 
Return on assets -34.02 5.88 4.84 53.68 7.17 
Return on equity -48.47 13.59 11.80 103.31 13.68 
Tobin's Q 0.49 1.83 1.33 14.28 1.51 
Number of board 
members 
4.00 10.41 10.00 25.00 3.21 
Number of men on the 
board 
3.00 8.57 8.00 25.00 3.33 
Number of women on 
the board 
- 1.85 2.00 8.00 1.34 
Percentage of women on 
the board 
- 18.69 16.67 66.67 13.50 
Environmental score  2.00   8.35   9.00   12.00   2.42  
Social score  2.00   8.32   9.00   12.00   2.18  
 
The large spread between the minimum and maximum and the large standard 
deviation of performance measures indicate that there is variation in company 
performance within the sample. Companies at the lower end include Beach Energy 
Limited (Australia) with an ROA of -34.03 and ROE of -48.47 for 2016 and Xero Limited 
(Australia) with an ROA of -23.34 and an ROE of -26.40 for 2017. Beach Energy 
Limited operates in the oil and gas industry. During the 2016 year, the oil and gas 
industry experienced a challenging operating environment (PwC, 2018). Beach 
Energy showed a 33% decline in realised oil prices which reduced their margins and 
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resulted in a significant loss for the year (Beach Energy, 2016). Xero Limited is a cloud-
based accounting computer software company. The losses are driven by high 
operating expenses, but economies of scale are expected in the 2018 financial year 
(Xero Limited, 2017). This can be seen through improved performance with ROA 
moving to -7.74 and ROE moving to -10.71 in the 2018 financial year. A challenging 
operating environment for the oil and gas industry and company specific factors have 
been identified as contributors to poor performance. 
Companies with the largest ROA include Magellan Financial Group (Australia) with an 
ROA of 53.68 in 2016 and 44.28 in 2017. Naspers Limited (South Africa) also showed 
a high ROA at 39.59 for 2018. Magellan Financial Group also displays relatively high 
ROE values at 60.22 for 2016 and 48.47 for 2017. Naspers Limited showed an ROE 
value of 59.19 for the 2018 financial year.  
Magellan Financial Group is a fund management company. The company manages 
over USD $40 billion worth of investments. The company also has very little debt 
relative to its asset base resulting in a consistent increase in revenue. The revenue for 
the 2016 financial year grew by USD $65 million whereas its expenses grew by just 
under USD $20 million year on year (Magellan Financial Group, 2016). The high 
margins and low levels of debt are reflected in both ROA and ROE ratios being 
relatively high and in line with each other for 2016 and 2017. Similarly, Naspers Limited 
experienced high levels of profitability and low levels of financial leverage in 2018. The 
large multinational earned the second highest profit figure in the sample (Toyota Motor 
Corporation, Japan, was first). Thus, both accounting performance measures are 
relatively high but in line with each other. 
Companies in the sample with high ROE values include Sydney Airport Group 
(Australia) with highest ROE at 103.31 for the 2018 financial year. Amcor Plc 
(Australia) also displays high ROE values with an ROE of 79.48 for 2018 and 75.38 
for 2017. However, the companies with the largest ROE values show relatively low 
ROA values. Sydney Airport Group reported an ROA value of 2.94 in 2018 whereas 
Amcor Plc reported ROA values of 7.99 and 6.72 for 2018 and 2017 respectively. 
Sydney Airport Group has not experienced unusually high profit levels compared to 
the companies in the sample, however, the Sydney Airport Group is significantly 
leveraged. It has one of the highest levels of leverage in the sample, second only to 
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Nomura Holdings Incorporation (Japan). In addition, Sydney Airport Group invested 
over AUD $300 million in 2018 in capital expenditure (Sydney Airport Group, 2018). 
The high levels of leverage and increased capital expenditure contributes to the higher 
ROE value and lower ROA value. Similarly, Amcor Plc is considerably more leveraged 
than the companies in the sample, contributing to higher ROE values. 
Xero Limited had the highest Tobin’s Q value of 14.28 in 2018, despite accounting 
performance measures being negative. The rapid reduction of losses in 2018 may 
have boosted investor confidence in the company based on the expectation of future 
profits, and thus an increased market value resulted. Harmony Gold Mining Company 
Limited (Harmony Gold) has the lowest Tobin’s Q value at 0.49 in 2017. Harmony Gold 
is a mining company based in South Africa which was profitable in 2018, however, job 
losses and disagreements between government and the Chamber of Mines on the 
Mining Charter (Harmony Gold Mining Company, 2017) reduced investor confidence 
in the company’s ability to generate future returns.  
The descriptive statistics support the need for both multiple accounting performance 
measures and a market measure. Different levels of performance are reflected 
depending on which performance measure is used and, thus, multiple measures 
contribute to a more holistic understanding and overall level of financial performance. 
The maximum board size of 25 is attributable to Toray Industries, a Japanese 
company. The maximum number of male directors is also 25 (also Toray Industries), 
indicating that the largest board in the sample is an all-male board. The maximum 
percentage of women on the board is at 67% and the maximum number of women on 
the board is 8. Both measures are attributable to JSE Ltd, a South African company. 
The contrast highlights that country-level factors potentially influence female 
representation on a company’s board. 
The median number of women on the board is 2, indicating that the median company 
does not have a critical mass of female directors. The median score for both the 
Environmental and Social Scores is 9, and the mean scores are 8.35 and 8.32 
respectively. Together with the small standard deviation for the Environmental Score 
at 2.42 and Social Score at 2.18, the descriptive statistics suggest that companies are 
performing fairly similarly in terms of environmental and social impact. 
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Companies with low environmental and social scores include Keyence Corporation, a 
Japanese company, with a score of 2 for both environmental and social performance 
in 2017. Keyence Corporation is a manufacturer of digital products including 
automated sensors, digital microscopes and barcode readers. The information and 
communications technology (ICT) industry has been under scrutiny due to forced 
labour practices in its global supply chains (McAvoy, 2016). In 2016, KnowTheChain, 
an organisation that benchmarks corporate practices, ranked 20 ICT companies on its 
strategies to eliminate forced labour (McAvoy, 2016). The scoring was out of 100, with 
100 being the highest. Keyence Corporation scored the lowest value of all 20 
companies, with a score of 0 (KnowTheChain, 2016), contributing to a low social 
performance score. Censible, a platform that aggregates ESG data (Censible, 2020a), 
noted that Keyence Corporation underperformed compared to its competitors in areas 
such as pollution prevention and water conservation (Censible, 2020b), resulting in a 
low environmental performance score. Other companies on the lower end of 
environmental and social performance include Brait SE (South Africa) and Sumitomo 
Realty and Development Company Limited (Japan) (both in the Financial sector, each 
with a score of 3 for environmental and social performance for 2017) and TPG 
Telecom Limited (Australia) in the ICT industry, scoring 3 for environmental 
performance and 2 for social performance in 2018. 
Companies with high environmental and social scores include Komatsu Limited 
Kumba Iron Ore Limited, the first being Japanese and the second being South African. 
Both companies scored a 12 for environmental and social performance in 2018. 
Komatsu Limited manufactures construction and mining equipment, and Kumba Iron 
Ore Limited operates mines for iron-ore. Both companies have outperformed in areas 
such as their use of natural resources, reduction in carbon emissions, workforce 
protection and community initiatives, all contributing to higher environmental and 
social performance. Of all the companies in the sample that scored a high of 12 for 
both environmental and social performance, approximately 70% of companies were 
from the Industrial sector. Studies suggest that Industrial sector experiences direct 
environmental and labour risks (Prado-Lorenzo, Rodríguez-Domínguez, Gallego-
Álvarez, & García-Sánchez, 2009; Weber, Diaz, & Schwegler, 2014) and stakeholder 
pressure to implement corporate social responsibility activities (Darnall, Henriques, & 
Sadorsky, 2010; Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006; Weber et al., 2014) resulting in improved 
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social and environmental performance. The descriptive statistics suggest that the 
sector in which the company operates may influence its environmental and social 
performance.  
The summary statistics in Table 1 show that the average percentage of women on the 
board is 19% over the three years in the sample period. Table 2 gives further insight 
on how that figure is spread across each year and for each country in the sample. 
Table 2: Percentage of female directors on the board of directors per country. 
  2016 2017 2018 3Y Average 
Australia 27% 29% 32% 29% 
South Africa 19% 21% 25% 22% 
Japan 6% 7% 8% 7% 
All 17% 19% 22% 19% 
 
While the average female representation over three years for all countries was 19%, 
Australia and South Africa show a higher average of 29% and 22% respectively, and 
Japan a much lower average of 7%. Both Australia and South Africa had only one 
company that had no female directors over the sample period. Japan had 31 
companies with no female directors. This result indicates that females are 
underrepresented on the boards of directors in Japan relative to Australia and South 
Africa. 
 
Australia had the highest gender parity in terms of Female Economic Participation and 
Opportunity and Female Education Attainment scores as measured by the World 
Economic Forum (2018a). Furthermore, both Australia and South Africa have 
voluntary corporate governance practices that promote gender diversity on the board 
of directors, whereas Japan has no such structures in place (Terjesen et al., 2016). 
Women in Japan perform five times the amount of unpaid work23 per day compared to 
men. In South Africa and Australia, women perform unpaid work 2.1 and 2.5 times 
(respectively) more than men. This finding suggests that despite women making up 
more than 40% of the workforce and professional workers in Australia, South Africa 
                                                          
23 Unpaid work consists of routine housework, shopping, caring for household and non-household 




and Japan (World Economic Forum, 2018a), women still play a key role in maintaining 
the household which may contribute to the lack of female representation on 
companies’ board of directors. This disparity is especially prevalent in Japan despite 
that country having better gender parity in terms of equal education for men and 
women when compared to South Africa (World Economic Forum, 2018a). Thus, the 
results in Table 2 suggest that solely increasing education opportunities for women is 
not sufficient to increase female representation at a board level. Opportunities for 
women and a shift in cultural norms need to be in place to achieve gender diversity on 
companies’ board of directors.  
 
More positively, Table 2 shows an increase in female representation on the board of 
directors for each country, year on year, throughout the sample period. In 2018, 
women represented 22% of the board on average across all three countries and 
sectors. However, in that same year, women constituted between 44%-47% of the 
workforce in Australia, Japan and South Africa. For professional and technical 
workers, these statistics are even higher: women constitute between 40%-52% of the 
professional and technical workers in these countries (World Economic Forum, 
2018a). Thus, the current workforce consists of skilled and professional women, but 
these women are not being represented proportionately at a board level. 
 
Further analysis of the distribution of female directors across different sectors was 
performed. Table 3 shows the female representation on the board of directors per 
sector.  
 
Table 3: Percentage of female directors on the board of directors per sector 
  2016 2017 2018 3Y Average 
Financials 20% 22%  26% 23% 
Industrials  16% 17% 20%  17% 
Resources  15% 20% 23%  19% 
All  17% 19% 22%   19% 
 
Prior literature has shown that women are better represented in the Financial and 
Consumer Goods sector, (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Grosvold et al., 2007; Joecks et 
al., 2013). Table 3 shows that female representation is the highest in the Financial 
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sector at 23%. Although the Industrial sector has the lowest percentage of women, it 
has the highest number of females on the board over the three years of the sample 
period. Over the sample period, the Industrial sector had an average of 242 women; 
the Resources sector had an average of 13 women; and the Financial sector had 146 
women. The number of women is of relevance when considering the impact of critical 
mass because women may prefer less male-dominated sectors and those that interact 
with the final consumer (Brammer et al., 2009). This may further suggest that women 
have a better understanding of the Financial and Industrial sectors than the Resources 
sectors because they may not have gained the relevant expertise required to serve as 
a director in the Resources sector as a result of the workforce being male-dominated. 
However, although females are under-represented in the Resources sector, female 
representation has increased year-on-year, suggesting that measures are in place to 
improve gender diversity in the Resources sector.  
 
Correlation Analysis 
A Pearson correlation is used in this research study to measure the linear correlation 
between pairs of continuous variables.  A Pearson correlation identifies near-linear 
relationships between pairs of variables. A variable inflation factor test is further 
performed to identify multi-collinearity between the independent variables. Table 4 





Table 4: Pearson correlation results for all continuous variables  























ROA 1.000          
ROE 0.751 1.000         
Tobin’s Q 0.509 0.395 1.000        
Percentage of 
women on the 
board 
0.039 0.158 0.061 1.000       
Critical Mass -0.032 0.091 -0.045 0.729 1.000      
Environmental 
Score 
-0.161 -0.053 -0.305 0.010 0.091 1.000     
Social Score -0.080 -0.011 -0.150 0.203 0.224 0.625 1.000    
Natural log of 
total assets 
-0.367 -0.231 -0.479 -0.220 0.010 0.511 0.304 1.000   
Leverage -0.221 -0.015 -0.198 0.046 0.022 0.087 0.014 0.200 1.000  






Table 4 indicates that the financial performance measure, ROA, has a strong positive24 
correlation with ROE (0.751) and a moderately positive correlation with Tobin’s Q 
(0.509). Although a strong positive correlation exists, the performance measures can 
differ vastly within a company as seen in the descriptive statistics. Further, in order to 
have a comprehensive reflection of performance, multiple performance measures are 
used (Rowe & Morrow, 1999). The non-financial measures (Environmental Score and 
Social Score) have a moderately positive correlation (0.625) with each other.  
 
A strong positive correlation (0.729) between the percentage of woman on the board 
and critical mass is also observed. This result supports the method of performing 
separate regressions for these two categories as the independent variable with each 
performance measure. Consistent with Isidro and Sobral (2015) and Willows and van 
der Linde (2016) separate regressions for the percentage of women on the board and 
critical mass are performed because the two measures are highly correlated. Table 4 
further shows that the Pearson correlation coefficients between the independent 
variables are relatively low (0.009 – 0.407) indicating that near-linear dependence 
between pairs of regressors are not present (Ratner, 2009). A variable inflation factor 
(VIF) test was performed on all continuous variables. VIF values ranged from 1.09 – 
2.93. All variables had a VIF lower than 10, indicating that multicollinearity is not 
present in the model (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2014).  
 
Regression Analysis 
For each regression performed, the Wald chi-squared test results were statistically 
significant at the 1% level. This result indicates that variables in the model have 
explanatory properties (Agresti, 2002). A likelihood-ratio test was performed for each 
regression. The results were statistically significant at the 1% level indicating that the 
mixed effects linear model is a better fit for the data than a one-level ordinary linear 
regression model (Agresti, 2002; Meloun & Militky, 2011). Lastly, two goodness-of-fit 
tests were performed using residual analysis. First, a histogram of the residuals was 
plotted which indicated that the distribution of the residuals did not deviate seriously 
                                                          
24 A strong positive correlation has a value of greater than 0.7. A moderate positive correlation ranges 
between 0.7 – 0.3. A low positive has a value lower than 0.3 (Ratner, 2009). 
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from a normal distribution. Therefore, the histogram indicates the model is a good fit 
(West et al., 2007). 
 
The standardized residuals for all models were plotted against the conditional 
predicted values. Models using the performance measures ROA, ROE, Environmental 
Score and Social Score predominantly followed a horizontal band barring some 
outliers, thus not seriously violating the assumption of constant variance (West et al., 
2007). Models which used Tobin’s Q as a performance measure presented a cone 
shaped pattern in the distribution of the residuals, demonstrating that 
heteroscedasticity is present in the model. Therefore, models that include Tobin’s Q 
as a performance measure were run using robust standard errors to account for 
heteroscedasticity (Hoechle, 2007).  
 
The regression analyses were repeated for the performance measures ROA, ROE, 
Environmental Score and Social Score with outliers removed from the dataset 
(Booysen, Botes, & Hamer, 2017). The direction of all relationships remained the same 
i.e. positive relationships remained positive and negative relationships remained 
negative. The statistical significance of the correlations between the performance 
measures and the independent variables remained unchanged in all but three 
instances. The statistical significance of the correlation between ROA and the 
percentage of women on the board moved from the 10% confidence level to 5%; 
between ROE and the percentage of women on the board moved from 1% to 5%; and 
between ROA and critical mass moved from 10% to 5%. The coefficients of the 
independent variables of each model were also impacted by removing the outliers. 
However, the impact on the coefficients is small. Differences between 0.0004 and 0.41 
were noted between the independent variable regression coefficients with all the data 
compared to the independent variable regression coefficients with the outliers 
removed. Therefore, outliers present in the model do not significantly change the 
model output or the conclusions drawn from the model. 
 
To identify whether female representation on the board has an impact on company 
performance, Table 5 presents the results of the regression for financial performance 
measures for all data points with percentage of women on the board and critical mass 
as the independent variables. Table 6 represents the regression results for non-
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financial performance. Lastly, an analysis of the regression results including 
interaction terms is presented. The reference groups for the categorical variables are 
as follows: Australia for the country variable, Financials for the sector variable, and 






Table 5: Regression results for the impact of female representation on the board on 
financial performance. 
 
Test 1: Percentage of women 
on the board 
Test 2: Critical Mass 







women on the 
board 
 0.043*  0.145*** 0.016***    
(0.025) (0.056) (0.005)    
Critical Mass 
   1.154* 2.571** 0.235* 
   (0.592) (1.229) (0.127) 
Industrials 
0.733 2.523* 0.089 0.773 1.238 0.095 
(0.79) (1.520) (0.169) (0.79) (1.69) (0.206) 
Resources 
-2.505 -7.706** -0.740*** -2.475 -7.617** -0.698*** 
(1.811) (3.455) (0.256) (1.812) (3.854) (0.249) 
Japan 
1.693 1.322 0.408 1.459 0.679 0.290 
(1.154) (2.144) (0.251) (1.08) (2.258) (0.285) 
South Africa 
-1.868** -0.0686 -0.657*** -2.025** -0.563 -0.766*** 
(0.904) (1.816) (0.194) (0.892) (1.894) (0.21) 
JP GAAP 
-0.811 -1.609 -0.18* -0.796 -2.784 -0.172 
(0.985) (1.652) (0.109) (0.985) (1.971) (0.105) 
US GAAP 
0.444 -0.695 -0.128 0.415 -0.996 -0.038 
(1.368) (2.337) (0.094) (1.366) (2.831) (0.094) 
Natural Log of 
Total Assets 
-1.614*** -1.456*** -0.373*** -1.640*** -1.69*0** -0.420*** 
(0.241) (0.463) (0.0611) (0.243) (0.511) (0.079) 
Leverage 
-0.091*** -0.006 -0.008*** -0.090*** -0.023 -0.008* 
(0.019) (0.035) (0.003) (0.019) (0.04) (0.004) 
Board Size 
0.139 0.134 0.0049 0.099 0.121 <-0.001 
(0.111) (0.192) (0.0112) (0.112) (0.228) (0.0123) 
Constant 
20.16*** 21.46*** 5.226*** 21.36*** 27.61*** 5.963*** 
(2.278) (4.214) (0.602) (2.234) (4.745) (0.837) 
Wald chi-
squared(10) 
114.71*** 42.33*** 110.28*** 103.85*** 35.8*** 72.7*** 
Observations 863 860 863 863 860 863 
Groups 294 293 294 294 293 294 
 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The numbers without brackets presents the regression 




Consistent with Sanan (2016), the results show that female representation on the 
board of directors (Test 1) has a statistically significant positive correlation to company 
performance in terms of accounting measures and market measures. Statistically, a 
1% increase in the percentage of women on the board will result in increases of 
0.043% for ROA, 0.15% for ROE and 0.016% for Tobin’s Q. The average board size 
in the sample is ten members. Therefore, one woman on the board would equate to 
10% of the board. Thus, when one woman is added to the board, ceteris paribus, ROA, 
ROE and Tobin’s Q increase by 0.43%, 1.5% and 0.16% respectively. An increase in 
ROA would be driven by either an increase in profit or a reduction in the asset base. 
The mean net profit for the sample is USD $1.066 billion. Assuming the asset base is 
kept constant, an increase of 0.43% in ROA results in a USD $4.58 million increase in 
net profit. Thus, these coefficients are economically significant, due to the increased 
profitability in dollar terms. 
 
When a company has reached critical mass in terms of the number of women on the 
board (Test 2 in Table 5), this also has a statistically significant positive correlation on 
company performance. When a company has three or more female directors, ceteris 
paribus, ROA increases by 1.15%, ROE by 2.57% and Tobin’s Q by 0.24%, compared 
to companies that have fewer than three female directors25. These results are 
consistent with the findings of Willows and van der Linde (2016) and thus suggest that 
companies experience a greater benefit from a female’s contribution when there are 
three or more female directors (Konrad et al., 2008). These results suggest that female 
representation on the board positively impacts financial performance in terms of both 
accounting and market measures, thus answering this study’s first research question 
and confirming the alternative hypothesis. 
 
Table 5 shows that the Industrial Sector has a statistically significantly higher ROE 
than the Financial Sector (in Test 1) and the Resources Sector has a statistically 
significantly lower ROE and Tobin’s Q than the Financial Sector (in Test 1 and 2). The 
standard deviations for ROE (as seen in Table 1) are much larger at 13.68 compared 
to ROA at 7.17, which demonstrates more variability in the ROE performance measure 
                                                          




compared to ROA. The reviewed literature does not offer an explanation as to why 
performance measures vary between the Financial and Industrial Sectors nor do 
specific market events during the period related to these two sectors. However, 
significant differences in performance measures per sector have been noted (Isidro & 
Sobral, 2015). Lückerath-Rover (2013) showed a statistically significantly lower ROE 
in the Financial Sector relative to Non-financial Sectors for Dutch companies. Using 
industry averages obtained from Damodaran (2020), the Financial Sector displayed a 
lower average ROE compared to the Industrial Sector average in 2019 for US 
companies. These results are consistent with what is seen in Table 5. The lower 
Tobin’s Q and ROE scores for the Resources Sector relates to Oil and Gas companies. 
These companies face unique challenges such as low oil and gas prices, the 
exploration for and discovery of shale gas, renewable energy (Van Der Ploeg, 2016) 
and cyclical over- and under-supply of oil (PwC, 2018). Between 2014 and 2016, oil 
and gas companies experienced a period of over-supply, resulting in lower oil prices 
and lower profits (England, 2016). Although the Oil and Gas sector is moving towards 
a period of under-supply, driving oil prices and profits up (Dickson, 2019), companies 
need time to recover from the volatility of the sector to see improved company 
performance (PwC, 2018). Thus, there are unique factors, such as cyclical supply and 
demand, experienced by the Oil and Gas sector between 2016 and 2018 which may 
contribute to lower ROE’s and Tobin’s Q’s in comparison to those of the Financial 
Sector. 
 
For the country variables, Table 5 shows that South Africa has a statistically 
significantly lower ROA and Tobin’s Q when compared to Australia. Unlike Australia, 
South Africa is an emerging market (World Economic Situation and Prospects, 2014) 
currently experiencing a weak economic environment. This weak economic 
environment and slow growth potential (The World Bank, 2018) may result in lower 
corporate profitability. Tobin’s Q reflects the sentiment of investors on the current and 
future prospects of the company (Rahman, Ibrahim, & Ahmad, 2017). The slow growth 
experienced in the South African market may influence investors to apply caution 
when valuing South African companies (Cairns, 2019). 
 
Companies using Japanese GAAP are shown to have a statistically significant lower 
Tobin’s Q than those using IFRS (in Test 1 of Table 5). The voluntary adoption of IFRS 
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for listed Japanese companies was introduced in 2010 (Gray, Nagata, Nakamura, & 
Ozu, 2019) which allowed listed Japanese companies to choose between Japanese 
GAAP, US GAAP or IFRS. In 2018, approximately 200 large multinationals 
representing 30% of the market capitalisation on the Tokyo Stock Exchange opted to 
use IFRS (Hoogervorst, 2018). Gray et al. (2019) suggests that while both adopters 
and non-adopters of IFRS agree that the transition is a costly exercise, adopters of 
IFRS believe that the benefit of international comparability, improvement in 
communication with overseas investors and improved transparency of financial 
information for shareholders, outweighs the transition costs. Gray et al. (2019) further 
argue that companies adopt IFRS when they expect favourable economic outcomes, 
such as improved market valuations and credit ratings. As a result, the use of IFRS 
compared to Japanese GAAP may influence investor sentiment and market value, as 
measured by Tobin’s Q, due to improved communication and transparency with 
investors.  
 
The final control variables show that the size (Natural Log of Total Assets) and 
leverage of the company is negatively statistically significant with all three performance 
measures (in both Test 1 and Test 2 of Table 5). Research suggests that although 
larger companies benefit from economies of scale, there is a limit to this benefit 
(Becker-Blease, Kaen, Etebari, & Baumann, 2010). At a certain level, medium and 
large companies experience the same economies of scale, but larger companies are 
exposed to higher transaction, agency and organisational costs which may reduce 
profitability and, thus, company value (Becker-Blease et al., 2010; Margaretha & 
Supartika, 2016). Leverage is also shown to have negatively statistically significant 
relationship with ROA and Tobin’s Q. Leverage may reduce company value because 
it adds more risk to the company (Isidro & Sobral, 2015; Kartikasari & Merianti, 2016) 
and diverts resources from investments to debt commitments (Isidro & Sobral, 2015).  
 
There is no statistically significant relationship between the size of the board and any 
of the three performance measures. Existing research demonstrates conflicting results 
between company performance and board size. Some studies show a positive 
relationship with board size and company performance and suggest that larger boards 
tend to be more efficient in monitoring activities, better at corporate governance and 
thus increase company value (Arulvel & Pratheepkanth, 2019; Johl, Kaur, & Cooper, 
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2015). Conversely, studies suggest that board size has a negative relationship with 
company performance due to higher operating costs, inefficient decision-making from 
less structure and control in meetings, and the risk of board members not fully 
participating and contributing to decisions, i.e. “free-riding26” (Azeez, 2015; Nguyen, 
Rahman, Tong, & Zhao, 2016). Although Choudhary (2015) and van der Westhuizen 
and Willows (2016) show that board size has no impact on company performance 
owing to existing high corporate governance standards, Vaidya (2019) suggests that 
while there is no statistically significant relationship between board size and company 
performance, and that no optimal board size exists, companies with board sizes 
between eight and ten showed better financial performance than companies with 
board sizes outside that range. 
 
Non-financial Performance 
To answer the second research question of this study, the regression of the 
independent variables against Non-financial Performance measures (being the 
Environmental Score and Social Score measured by Refinitiv) is included in Table 6.   
 
Table 6: Regression results for the impact of female representation on the board on 
Non-financial Performance. 
 
Test 1: Percentage of women 
on the board 









women on the 
board 
0.009 0.019***   
(0.006) (0.006)   
Critical Mass 
  -0.020 0.200 
  (0.112) (0.125) 
Industrials 
0.353 0.863*** 0.372 0.875*** 
(0.3) (0.28) (0.3) (0.285) 
Resources 
0.339 0.576 0.242 0.560 
(0.713) (0.666) (0.716) (0.678) 
Japan 
0.261 -0.383 0.029 -0.691** 
(0.368) (0.359) (0.356) (0.347) 
South Africa 
0.007 -0.167 -0.023 -0.255 
(0.321) (0.304) (0.319) (0.307) 
                                                          
26 “Free-riding” is defined as individuals benefiting from the work of others without contributing to the 




-0.045 -0.960*** -0.039 -0.955*** 
(0.228) (0.248) (0.231) (0.249) 
US GAAP 
0.414 -0.057 0.397 -0.096 




0.702*** 0.602*** 0.725*** 0.618*** 
(0.081) (0.079) (0.082) (0.08) 
Leverage 
<-0.001 -0.009 0.001 0.019 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.027) (0.029) 
Board Size 
0.004 0.030 <-0.001 -0.009 
(0.027) (0.029) (0.006) (0.006) 
Constant 
1.202 1.931** 1.277 2.318*** 
(0.804) (0.776) (0.807) (0.783) 
Wald chi-
squared(10) 
131.56*** 103.66*** 126.19*** 93.5*** 
Observations 796 796 796 796 
Groups 284 284 284 284 
 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The numbers without brackets present the regression 
coefficients and bracketed numbers present the standard errors.  
 
Female representation on the board of directors is shown to have a statistically 
significant positive relationship with the Social Performance, but not the Environmental 
Performance, of a company. Furthermore, Table 6 indicates that the significant 
correlation with the Non-financial Performance measures is limited to the percentage 
of women on the board only; there is no statistically significant correlation between 
Critical Mass and Non-financial Performance measures. It is important to remember 
that the Social Performance score is measured as a continuous variable from 1 to 12, 
which was recoded from D- to A+. Thus, adding one woman to the board (assuming 
that one woman represents 10% of the board27) will increase the Social Score by 0.19. 
These results are not economically significant, as an increase of 0.19 does not have 
a large impact on an improved Social Score. When explained further, it becomes 
obvious that for companies that are A-rated, an increase of 0.19 will not definitively 
push the company to an A+ rating, demonstrating limited economic significance.  
 
                                                          
27 The average board size in the sample is ten members. Therefore, one woman on the board would 
equate to 10% of the board. 
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However, these results do confirm the findings of Alazzani et al. (2017) who suggested 
that women tend to pay more attention to social issues than environmental issues. 
Byron and Post (2016) and Hoyt (2017) suggest that female directors tend to focus on 
social issues as these align with their values pertaining to corporate social 
responsibility. These values include avoiding harm and feeling responsible for the 
wellbeing of others (Byron & Post, 2016) and are translated into strategic social 
decisions at a board level (Nielsen & Huse, 2010). Thus, in answer to the second 
research question, the results of this study show that women on the board positively 
influence the company’s social performance but have no influence on its 
environmental performance. 
 
The Industrials Sector has a statistically significantly higher social score than the 
Financial Sector. Studies show that CSR performance in the Financial Sector is 
weaker compared to other sectors (Ortas, Álvarez, & Garayar, 2015) owing to less 
pressure by stakeholders to improve CSR performance (Weber et al., 2014). In 
particular, Weber et al. (2014) suggest that the Financial Sector underperforms on 
social issues such as labour concerns and community initiatives because they have 
less of a direct impact and because labour issues are not as prevalent as in the 
Industrial Sector. 
 
Table 6 also shows that Japanese companies have statistically significantly lower 
social scores than Australian companies (in Test 2 only). Although Japanese 
companies tend to be the front-runners for environmental policies, they lag behind in 
terms of social initiatives (Jackson & Bartosch, 2017). Jackson and Bartosch (2017) 
examined the CSR activities of 24 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries. Japan was noted to have weak development in 
employment related CSR policies and gave less charitable donations than the average 
OECD country. This factor would contribute to a lower Social Score. 
 
Also, companies that use Japanese GAAP have a lower Social Score than those that 
use IFRS. Large multinationals listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange tend to use IFRS 
rather than Japanese GAAP (Bank of Japan, 2018); thus, these larger multinational 
companies may have more resources for social initiatives. Supporting this assumption, 
the natural log of total assets has a statistically significant positive relationship with 
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both the Environmental and Social Scores. D’Amato and Falivena (2019) suggest that 
larger companies have more resources and experience to effect environmental and 
social change. Lastly, the Environmental and Social Scores are based on public 
information. Larger companies tend to have better CSR disclosure than smaller 
companies which may influence their Environmental and Social Scores (Dias, 
Rodrigues, & Craig, 2017). 
 
Cross-country Comparison 
A country comparison is performed by running a new regression with interaction terms 
between the independent variables (Percentage of Women on the Board and Critical 
Mass) and the categorical country variables. The results of the regressions can be 
found in the Tables provided in Appendix C. 
 
The results of the regression suggest that there is no statistically significant 
relationship between the interaction terms and the financial performance measures. 
This indicates that despite Australia, Japan and South Africa having different cultural 
norms, economic and regulatory environments, varying levels of gender parity in terms 
of Educational Attainment and Economic Participation and Opportunity, there is little 
difference between countries in terms of the impact that women on the boards of 
directors have on company performance. Explained differently, female representation 
on boards in Japan and South Africa have a similar impact on a company’s financial 
performance as female representation on boards in Australia.  
 
While country-level factors have little influence on the impact that women on the board 
have on financial performance, the descriptive statistics indicate that country-level 
factors may influence the number of women on the board. Of the three countries, 
Australia has the highest average level of female representation and Japan the lowest. 
Australia also has better gender parity in terms of Educational Attainment, Economic 
Participation and Opportunity than Japan and South Africa (World Economic Forum, 
2018a). Therefore, the descriptive statistics suggest that gender parity, educational 
attainment, economic participation, economic opportunity and gender quotas are 
necessary to create gender diverse boards for companies. The lack of female 
representation on company boards in certain countries may contribute to mixed results 
(being female representation on the board having a positive, negative and no impact 
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on a company’s financial performance) owing to the limited number of females in the 
sample. However, country-level factors itself do not influence the impact that women 
may have on financial performance. 
 
Consistent with the results seen in financial performance, there is no statistically 
significant difference in the impact of women board members and non-financial 
performance between Japan and South Africa when compared to Australia. Contrary 
to the previously mentioned suggestion by Byron and Post (2016), country-level 
factors do not significantly influence the impact that women have on a company’s 
social and environmental performance. The results of this study fail to reject the null 
hypothesis in respect of the final research question.  Thus, country-level factors (such 
as differences in gender parity in terms of educational attainment and economic 
participation and opportunity, country culture and economic environment) do not 
influence the level of impact female board members have on company performance. 
Although no statistically significant relationships were found between country-level 
factors and the impact of female representation, the regressions presented in Tables 
5 and 6 control for the influence of country-level factors on performance measures. A 
statistically significant positive relationship exists between female representation and 
financial and social performances. Nevertheless, as noted previously, the descriptive 
statistics suggest that country-level factors may influence the number of women 
represented on the board.   
  
The statistically significant positive correlations between the percentage of women on 
the board and all financial performance measures remains when including interaction 
terms in the regression model. Conversely, the positive correlation between critical 
mass and ROE and Tobin’s Q is no longer statistically significant. This fact may be as 
a result of companies with higher ROEs tending to more financially leveraged and, 
therefore, more risky (Correia, 2019). As previously mentioned, the reviewed literature 
suggests that women tend to be more risk-averse than men (Croson & Gneezy, 2009; 
Willows & West, 2014) which may contribute to the lack of statistical significance 
between critical mass and ROE. Willows and van der Linde (Willows & van der Linde, 
2016) suggest that the presence of women is not being incorporated into shareholders’ 
valuation of companies, and, therefore, is not reflected in Tobin’s Q. Although the 
inclusion of the interaction terms may have weakened the relationship between critical 
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mass and financial performance, consistent with Table 5, the relationship remains 
positive and the coefficients remain larger than those in Test 1, (where percentage of 
women on the board was the independent variable) reiterating that companies with 
critical mass have improved financial performance compared to companies with less 
than three female board members.  
 
Other notable differences between the regressions presented in Table 5 and those 
that include interaction terms (in Appendix C) are that the Industrials Sector no longer 
has a statistically significantly higher ROE than the Financial Sector, and South Africa 
no longer has a statistically significantly lower ROE than Australia, but Japan has a 
statistically significantly higher ROA and Tobin’s Q than Australia (in Test 1). The 
results suggest that the relationships between the control variables and performance 





The review of existing literature conducted for this study has demonstrated mixed 
results between female representation on a company’s board and its financial 
performance. This research has suggested a number of reasons for these mixed 
results, such as the use of different performance measures, single-country studies 
(Byron & Post, 2016) and the omission of critical mass (Lückerath-Rovers, 2013). This 
study extends existing literature by examining a cross-country comparison between 
the percentages of women on the board and exploring the impact of having critical 
mass using multiple performance measures.  
 
The results of the research undertaken show that female representation on the board 
has a positive and significant relationship on accounting and market measures of the 
company’s financial performance. The results support other research findings that 
suggest that women have unique skills compared to men. Their expertise28 and added 
diversity enhance board decision-making (Kim & Starks, 2016) and contribute to 
improved profitability. Critical mass also shows a positive and significant relationship 
with financial performance measures. These findings also support research that 
suggests women are able to improve their contribution when there are three or more 
women on the board, compared to when there are less than three (Konrad et al., 
2008). 
 
Female representation on the board is also shown to have an impact on non-financial 
performance. The results of the regression show that female representation on the 
board is positively and significantly related to social performance at the 1% confidence 
level. Research suggests that women affect social performance in particular owing to 
their individual values and caring nature (Hoyt, 2017). The research results also 
support the idea that women contribute indirectly to company performance through 
higher social standards and social impact (Isidro & Sobral, 2015). 
 
Australia, South Africa and Japan were specifically explored owing to the contrast in 
cultures and differential gender parities. The research results show that country-level 
                                                          
28 Refer to footnote 4 in the Board Diversity subsection of the Literature Review for the areas of 
expertise identified by Kim and Starks (2016). 
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factors do not significantly influence the impact that women on the board have on 
financial and non-financial performance. However, the descriptive statistics indicate 
that there may be a relationship between country-level factors and the number of 
female directors. Japan had the lowest levels of female representation and Australia 
has the highest, with South Africa falling closer to Australia. When compared to the 
gender parity of each country, Australia scores the highest out of the three countries 
in both Educational Attainment and Economic Participation and Opportunity for 
women. South Africa scores lower than Japan in the equal Educational Attainment of 
women but higher in Economic Participation and Opportunity (World Economic Forum, 
2018a). These results suggest that women need both education and opportunity to be 
fairly represented on companies’ board of directors.  
 
The aim of this study is to demonstrate empirical evidence that gender diversity at a 
board level is relevant to company performance. Gender diversity brings novel 
perspectives and contributes to enhanced strategic decision making (Nielsen & Huse, 
2010), which translates into improved financial and social performance. Country-level 
factors do not limit the ability of women to contribute to the boardroom discussion but 
may limit the number of women on the board. Introducing gender diversity with one 
woman is enough to make a difference; however, companies are able to maximise the 
contribution of females when there are three or more women on the board. The optimal 
board structure should maximise the effectiveness of the board of directors and 
profitability of the company. Two important distinctions for stakeholders and 
shareholders are noted: 1) women make a differential contribution to company 
performance and 2) the number of women on the board plays a role in the contribution 
that female directors are able to make. Female representation on the board makes for 
an important business case in order to extract the best performance from the board as 
a whole and, in turn, the company.  
 
Recommendations 
The results of this study has highlighted that there is merit in having a gender-diverse 
board. Increased female representation allows for diverse expertise (Harrison & Klein, 
2007), improved risk and oversight (Brown et al., 2002) contributing to more effective 
decision-making (Konrad et al., 2008) and improved Financial and Social 
Performance. Critical mass further contributes to the merit of increased female 
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representation. The results demonstrate that having three or more women on the 
board allows companies to maximise the contribution of these women to improve their 
financial performance. Thus, a competent recommendation is for companies to 
appoint a minimum of three women on the board to avoid tokenism and maximise the 
contribution from its female directors (Konrad et al., 2008).  
 
The literature review has highlighted that companies that operate in countries with 
legislated board gender quotas, or which have recommended corporate governance 
practices in relation to gender parity on the board, tend to have higher levels of female 
representation (Terjesen et al., 2015; Yang et al., 2019). In order to promote board 
gender parity, government regulation (in the form of a gender quotas or corporate 
governance codes) requiring companies to have a certain level of female 
representation on the board is recommended.  
 
This study further highlights country-level factors that may contribute to increased 
female representation on the board. Specifically, gender parity in terms of educational 
attainment and economic participation and opportunity are required to increase gender 
diversity on the board. The results show that education alone is not enough to increase 
female representation on the board, but economic participation and opportunity also 
need to exist to increase gender diversity on the board. A consequent 
recommendation is for companies to implement and support initiatives that promote 
the education of women and provide in-house training to upskill women. Companies 
should also create more opportunities for career progression and the consequent 
promotion of women within the company, in order to achieve gender parity at a board 
level. 
 
Areas for Future Research 
This study examined three countries that differ in terms of gender parity and cultural 
norms to determine whether country-level factors influence the impact that women 
have on the board. The study could be extended to include more countries with varying 
levels of gender parity to gain a better understanding of the influence of country-level 





This study also aimed to determine whether increased female representation on the 
board results in improved financial and non-financial performance. The study could be 
expanded to assess whether director positions influence the level of impact that female 
directors are able to have on company performance. Explained further, research could 
explore whether there is a different level of impact on financial and non-financial 
performance if the female director is an executive director or a non-executive director.  
 
Moreover, this study examined the impact of female representation on social and 
environmental performance. An extension of the study could be performed by 
examining other areas of performance such as corporate governance and compliance.  
 
Lastly, research has highlighted that measures of women on the board are 
concentrated in certain sectors (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Grosvold et al., 2007; Joecks 
et al., 2013). A comparison between sectors as to whether the impact on company 
performance of female representation on the board is influenced by the nature of the 









Table 7: List of companies included in the sample 
 Australia: Australia 
Stock Exchange 






Afterpay Touch Group 
Ltd 
Aeon Co. Ltd Absa Group Ltd 
2 AGL Energy Ltd ANA Holdings Inc. AECI Ltd 
3 Als Ltd 




4 Altium Ltd Asahi Kasei Co. Ltd 
Anglo American 
Platinum Ltd 
5 Alumina Ltd Astellas Pharma Inc.   Anglo American Plc. 
6 Amcor Plc  
Bandai Namco Holdings 
Inc. 
AngloGold Ashanti Ltd 
7 AMP Ltd Bridgestone Co. Ltd 
Anheuser-Busch InBev 
SA/NV 
8 Ansell Ltd Canon Inc.   
Aspen Pharmacare 
Holdings Ltd 
9 ANZ Banking Group Ltd 
Central Japan Railway 
Co. Ltd   
Assore Ltd 
10 APA Group Ltd 
Chugai Pharmaceutical 
Co. Ltd   
AVI Ltd 
11 Aristocrat Leisure 
Dai-ichi Life Holdings 
Inc. 
Barloworld Ltd 
12 ASX Ltd Daiichi Sankyo Co. Ltd   Bid Co.oration Ltd 
13 Atlas Arteria Ltd Daikin Industries Ltd   Brait SE 
14 Aurizon Holdings Ltd 




15 Ausnet Services Ltd Denso Co. Ltd 
Capital & Counties 
Properties Plc. 
16 Bank of Queensland East Japan Railway Co.   
Capitec Bank Holdings 
Ltd 
17 Beach Energy Ltd Eisai Co. Ltd   Clicks Group Ltd 
18 Bendigo and Adelaide FamilyMart Co. Ltd 
Compagnie Financiere 
Richemont SA 
19 BHP Billiton Ltd FANUC Co. Ltd 
Coronation Fund 
Managers Ltd 
20 Bluescope Steel Ltd Fast Retailing Co. Ltd   Curro Holdings Ltd 
21 Boral Ltd Fujitsu Ltd 
Dis-Chem Pharmacies 
Ltd 
22 Brambles Ltd Hitachi Ltd   Discovery Ltd 
23 Caltex Australia Ltd Honda Motor Co. Ltd   
Distell Group Holdings 
Ltd 
24 Carsales.com Ltd Hoya Co. Ltd EPP N.V. 
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25 Challenger Ltd Inpex Co. Ltd Exxaro Resources Ltd 
26 Charter Hall Group Ltd Itochu Co. Ltd  FirstRand Ltd 
27 Cimic Group Ltd Japan Tobacco Inc.   Fortress REIT Ltd 
28 Cleanaway Waste Ltd JXTG Holdings Inc. Glencore Plc. 
29 Coca-Cola Amatil Ltd 
Kansai Electric Power 
Co Inc. 
Globe Trade Centre 
S.A. 
30 Cochlear Ltd Kao Co. Ltd   Gold Fields Ltd 
31 
Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia Ltd 
KDDI Co. Ltd 
Growthpoint Properties 
Ltd 
32 Computershare Ltd Keyence Co. Ltd Hammerson Plc. 
33 Crown Resorts Ltd Kirin Holdings Co. Ltd 
Harmony Gold Mining 
Company Ltd 
34 CSL Ltd Komatsu Ltd Hyprop Investments Ltd 
35 CYBG Plc Kubota Co. Ltd 
Impala Platinum 
Holdings Ltd 




M3 Inc. Intu Properties Plc. 
38 Downer Edi Ltd Marubeni Co. Ltd Investec Ltd 
39 Duluxgroup Ltd 
Mitsubishi Chemical 
Holdings Co. Ltd 
Investec Plc. 
40 Evolution Mining Ltd Mitsubishi Co. Ltd  Italtile Ltd 
41 Flight Centre Travel 
Mitsubishi Electric Co. 
Ltd   
JSE Ltd 
42 Fortescue Metals Group 
Mitsubishi Estate Co. 
Ltd   
KAP Industrial Holdings 
Ltd 
43 Goodman Group  
Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries Ltd 
Kumba Iron Ore Ltd 
44 GPT Group  
Mitsubishi UFJ 
Financial Group Inc.   
Liberty Holdings Ltd 
45 Iluka Resources Mitsui & Co. Ltd   
Life Healthcare Group 
Holdings Ltd 




Mizuho Financial Group 
Inc.   





Group Holdings Inc. 
Massmart Holdings Ltd 
49 JB Hi-Fi Ltd 
Murata Manufacturing 
Co. Ltd   
Mediclinic International 
Plc. 
50 Lendlease Group  Nexon Co. Ltd MMI Holdings Ltd 
51 Link Admin Holding Nidec Co. Ltd Mondi Ltd 
52 Macquarie Group Ltd Nintendo Co. Ltd   Montauk Holdings Ltd 
53 Magellan Fin Group Ltd 
Nippon Paint Holdings 
Co. Ltd 
Mr Price Group Ltd 
54 Medibank Private Ltd Nippon Steel Co. MTN Group Ltd 
55 Mirvac Group  
Nippon Telegraph & 





National Australia Bank 
Ltd 
Nitori Holdings Co. Ltd Nedbank Group Ltd 
57 Newcrest Mining Ltd Nomura Holdings Inc. NEPI Rockcastle Plc. 
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59 Northern Star Ltd NTT Data Co. Ltd Northam Platinum Ltd 
60 Oil Search Ltd NTT DOCOMO Inc.   Old Mutual Ltd 
61 Orica Ltd Olympus Co. Ltd Pepkor Holdings Ltd 
62 Origin Energy Omron Co. Ltd Pick n Pay Stores Ltd 
63 Orora Ltd 
Oriental Land Co. 
Ltd/Japan   
Pioneer Food Group Ltd 
64 OZ Minerals Ltd Orix Co. PSG Group Ltd 
65 Pendal Group Ltd 
Otsuka Holdings Co. 
Ltd   
PSG Konsult Ltd 
66 Qantas Airways Ltd Panasonic Co. Ltd Quilter Plc. 
67 QBE Insurance Group Rakuten Inc. 
Rand Merchant 
Investment Holdings Ltd 
68 QUBE Holdings Ltd 
Recruit Holdings Co. 
Ltd   
RCL Foods Ltd 
69 
Ramsay Health Care 
Ltd 
Secom Co. Ltd RDI REIT Plc. 
70 REA Group Sekisui House Ltd Redefine Properties Ltd 
71 Reliance Worldwide 
Seven & i Holdings Co. 
Ltd   
Reinet Investments 
SCA 
72 Resmed Inc.  Shimano Inc. Remgro Ltd 
73 RIO Tinto Ltd 
Shin-Etsu Chemical Co. 
Ltd   
Resilient REIT Ltd 
74 Santos Ltd Shionogi & Co. Ltd Reunert Ltd 
75 Scentre Group  Shiseido Co. Ltd   RMB Holdings Ltd 
76 Seek Ltd SMC Co. Ltd Sanlam Ltd 
77 Sonic Healthcare Ltd SoftBank Group Co. Ltd Santam Ltd 
78 
Washington H. Soul 
Pattinson and Co. Ltd 
Sompo Holdings Inc. Sappi Ltd 
79 South32 Ltd Sony Co. Ltd Sasol Ltd 
80 Spark Infrastructure Ltd Subaru Co. Ltd Shoprite Holdings Ltd 
81 Stockland Ltd Sumitomo Co. Ltd Sibanye Gold Ltd 
82 SunCo. Group Ltd 
Sumitomo Mitsui 
Financial Group Inc.   
Sirius Real Estate Ltd 
83 Sydney Airport Ltd 
Sumitomo Mitsui Trust 
Holdings Inc. 
Standard Bank Group 
Ltd 
84 TabCo. Holdings Ltd 
Sumitomo Realty & 
Development Co. Ltd 
Super Group Ltd 
85 Telstra Corporation Ltd 
Suntory Beverage & 
Food Ltd 
Telkom SA SOC Ltd 
86 
The a2 Milk Company 
Ltd 
Suzuki Motor Co.   The Bidvest Group Ltd 
87 The Star Ent Group Ltd Sysmex Co. Ltd The Foschini Group Ltd 
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88 TPG Telecom Ltd 
Takeda Pharmaceutical 
Co. Ltd   
The SPAR Group Ltd 
89 Transurban Group TDK Co. Ltd Tiger Brands Ltd 
90 
Treasury Wine Estate 
Ltd 
Terumo Co. Ltd 
Truworths International 
Ltd 
91 Unibailrodawestfield SE 
Tokio Marine Holdings 
Inc.   
TSOGO Sun Gaming 
92 Vicinity Centres Ltd Tokyo Electron Ltd Vivo Energy Plc. 
93 Wesfarmers Ltd Toray Industries Inc. Vodacom Group Ltd 
94 
Westpac Banking Co. 
Ltd 
Toray Industries Inc. 
Vukile Property Fund 
Ltd 
95 Whitehaven Coal Ltd 







Toyota Motor Co. Ltd  
97 Woolworths Group Ltd Toyota Tsusho Co. Ltd  
98 Worleyparsons Ltd Unicharm Co. Ltd  
99 Xero Ltd 
West Japan Railway 
Co. Ltd 
 





Table 8: Description of variables used. 
Variable Description 
ROA 
Continuous variable. Return on Assets. Percentage of net 
income to total assets. 
ROE 
Continuous variable. Return on Equity. Percentage of net income 
to total equity. 
TQ 
Continuous variable. Tobin's Q. Percentage of market value of 
the company over total assets. 
Escore 
Continuous variable. Takes a value of 1 to 12. A+ being 12, D- 
being 1. 
Sscore 
Continuous variable. Takes a value of 1 to 12. A+ being 12, D- 
being 1. 
Percentwob 
Continuous variable. Percentage of women on the board of 
directors. 
Cm 
Binary variable. Takes a value of 1 if there are three or more 
women on the board of directors, 0 otherwise. 
Sector 
Categorical variable of the company sector as per ICB sector 
code.  
Country Categorical variable of the country in which the company is listed.  
Frf 




Interaction term between percentage of women on the board and 
the categorical country variable. 
Cm*country 
Interaction term between critical mass and the categorical 
country variable. 
Lnta Natural log of total assets. 
Lev Percentage of total liabilities over total assets 







Table 9: Regression results for the impact of female representation on the board on 
Financial Performance including interaction terms.  
 
 
Test 1: Percentage of women 
on the board 
Test 2: Critical Mass 







women on the 
board 
0.072** 0.137* 0.021***    
(0.036) (0.082) (0.007)    
Critical Mass 
   1.314* 1.402 0.272 
   (0.785) (1.628) (0.202) 
Industrials 
0.818 2.277 0.094 0.789 1.124 0.097 
(0.799) (1.535) (0.169) (0.791) (1.688) (0.207) 
Resources 
-2.422 -7.850** -0.726*** -2.466 -7.694** -0.696*** 
(1.816) (3.435) (0.255) (1.811) (3.843) (0.249) 
Japan 
2.753* 1.793 0.505** 1.522 0.263 0.298 
(1.521) (2.717) (0.235) (1.099) (2.285) (0.288) 
South Africa 
-0.46 -1.33 -0.543** -1.869* -1.624 -0.744*** 
(1.614) (2.919) (0.22) (1.02) (2.106) (0.218) 
JP GAAP 
-0.827 -1.683 -0.180* -0.795 -2.759 -0.171 
(0.987) (1.645) (0.108) (0.986) (1.97) (0.105) 
US GAAP 
0.44 -0.799 -0.128 0.427 -1.044 -0.038 





women on the 
board x 
Japan 
-0.062 -0.077 -0.011    
(0.072) (0.143) (0.014)    
Percentage of 
women on the 
board x South 
Africa 
-0.055 0.078 -0.009    
(0.055) (0.127) (0.008)    
Critical Mass 
x Japan 
   -0.164 -0.020 -0.119 
   (3.555) (7.506) (0.197) 
 Critical mass 
x South 
Africa 
   -0.366 2.769 -0.084 




-1.608*** -1.450*** -0.373*** -1.643*** -1.672*** -0.420*** 
(0.241) (0.460) (0.061) (0.243) (0.510) (0.080) 
Leverage 
-0.092*** -0.004 -0.009*** -0.09*** -0.021 -0.008* 




0.133 0.112 0.005 0.101 0.106 <-0.001 
(0.112) (0.191) (0.011) (0.113) (0.228) (0.012) 
Constant 
19.29*** 21.91*** 5.157*** 21.29*** 28.08*** 5.95*** 





43.8*** 124.69*** 114.05* 37.13*** 80.18*** 
Observations 863 860 863 863 860 863 
Groups 294 293 294 294 293 294 
 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The numbers without brackets presents the regression 





Table 10: Regression results for the impact female representation on the board for 
Non-financial Performance including interaction terms 
 
Test 1: Percentage of women 
on the board 









of women on 
the board 
0.006 0.016**   
(0.008) (0.008)   
Critical Mass  
  -0.078 0.232 
  (0.143) (0.160) 
Industrials 
0.337 0.842*** 0.368 0.878*** 
(0.300) (0.280) (0.300) (0.286) 
Resources 
0.319 0.552 0.234 0.566 
(0.713) (0.665) (0.715) (0.678) 
Japan 
0.169 -0.413 0.003 -0.678* 
(0.421) (0.421) (0.358) (0.351) 
South Africa 
-0.247 -0.464 -0.099 -0.208 
(0.439) (0.444) (0.336) (0.329) 
JP GAAP 
-0.048 -0.967*** -0.038 -0.956*** 
(0.228) (0.248) (0.231) (0.249) 
US GAAP 
0.412 -0.064 0.396 -0.095 
(0.323) (0.35) (0.328) (0.352) 
Percentage 
of women on 
the board x 
Japan 
0.003 -0.004   
(0.017) (0.018)   
Percentage 
of women on 
the board x 
South Africa 
0.011 0.012   
(0.013) (0.013)   
Critical Mass 
x Japan 
  -0.036 0.206 




  0.162 -0.099 




0.702*** 0.601*** 0.725*** 0.617*** 
(0.081) (0.079) (0.081) (0.08) 
Leverage 
>-0.001 -0.009 >-0.001 -0.009 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Board Size 
0.004 0.030 0.001 0.020 




* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The numbers without brackets present the regression 
coefficients and bracketed numbers present the standard errors.  
  
Constant 
1.311 2.038*** 1.301 2.305*** 
(0.815) (0.789) (0.807) (0.785) 
Wald chi-
squared(12) 
132.56*** 105.12*** 127.12*** 93.65*** 
Observations 796 796 796 796 




Abdullah, S. N. (2014). The causes of gender diversity in Malaysian large firms. 
Journal of Management and Governance, 18(4), 1137–1159. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-013-9279-0 
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2009). Women in the boadroom and their impact on 
governance and performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 94, 291–309. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.10.007 
Adriaanse, J. A. (2017). Quotas to Accelerate Gender Equity in Sport Leadership: Do 
they work? In L. J. Burton & S. Leberman (Eds.), Women in Sport Leadership: 
Research and Practice for Change (First). Routledge. 






Al-Bahrani, M., Aldhafri, S., Alkharusi, H., Kazem, A., & Alzubiadi, A. (2013). Age 
and gender differences in coping style across various problems: Omani 
adolescents’ perspective. Journal of Adolescence, 36(2), 303–309. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adolescence.2012.11.007 
Alazzani, A., Hassanein, A., & Al-Janadi, Y. (2017). Impact of gender diversity on 
social and environmental performance evidence from Malaysia. Corporate 
Governance, 17(2), 266–283. 
Allen, S. H., & Mendez, S. N. (2018). Hegemonic Heteronormativity: Toward a New 
Era of Queer Family Theory. Journal of Family Theory and Review, 10(1), 70–
86. https://doi.org/10.1111/jftr.12241 
Anderson, R. C., Reeb, D. M., Upadhyay, A., & Zhao, W. (2011). The Economics of 
Director Heterogeneity. Financial Management, 5–38. 
Arulvel, K. K., & Pratheepkanth, P. (2019). Board Composition and firm performance: 
The Sri Lankan Case. Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review 
(Oman Chapter), 8(1), 40–49. https://doi.org/10.12816/0052851 
Asch, S. E. (1955). Opinions and Social Pressure. Scientific American, 193(5), 31–
35. 
Australian Institute of Company Directors. (2017). Key competencies for directors. 
84 
 
Retrieved December 3, 2019, from 
https://aicd.companydirectors.com.au/resources/director-tools/practical-tools-for-
directors/board-composition/key-competencies-for-directors 
Azeez, A. A. (2015). Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: Evidence from 
Sri Lanka. Journal of Finance and Bank Management, 3(1), 180–189. 
https://doi.org/10.15640/jfbm.v3n1a16 
Bank of Japan. (2018). Japan’s Economy and Monetary Policy: Speech at a Meeting 
with Business Leaders in Oita. Retrieved from 
https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/press/koen_2018/data/ko180131a1.pdf 
Barber, B. M., & Odean, T. (2001). Boys Will be Boys: Gender , Overconfidence, and 
Common Stock Investment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(1), 261–
292. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhm079 
Bartol, K. M., & Butterfield, D. A. (1976). Sex effects in evaluating leaders. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 61(4), 446–454. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-
9010.61.4.446 
Bass, B. M., Avolio, B. J., & Atwater, L. (1996). The transformational and 
transactional leadership of men and women. Applied Psychology: An 
International Review, 45(1), 5–34. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1464-
0597.1996.tb00847.x 
Baysinger, B. D., & Butler, H. N. (1985). Corporate Governance and the Board of 
Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition. The Journal 
of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1(1), 101–124. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036883 
Beach Energy. (2016). Beach Energy Annual Report 2016. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/cind.7612_7.x 
Becker-Blease, J. R., Kaen, F. R., Etebari, A., & Baumann, H. (2010). Employees, 
Firm Size and Profitability in U.S. Manufacturing Industries. Investment 
Management and Financial Innovations, 7(2), 7–23. 
Ben-Amar, W., & McIlkenny, P. (2015). Board Effectiveness and the Voluntary 
Disclosure of Climate Change Information. Business Strategy and the 
Environment, 24(8), 704–719. https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.1840 
Bernile, G., Bhagwat, V., & Yonker, S. (2018). Board diversity, firm risk, and 




Beyer, S. (1998). Gender differences in self-perception and negative recall biases. 
Sex Roles, 38(1–2), 103–133. 
Biernat, M., & Fuegen, K. (2001). Shifting standards and the evaluation of 
competence: Complexity in gender-based judgment and decision making. 
Journal of Social Issues, 57(4), 707–724. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-
4537.00237 
Bloomberg. (2019). Bloomberg the Company & Its products: About us. Retrieved 
November 22, 2019, from 
https://www.bloomberg.com/company/?utm_source=bloomberg-
menu&utm_medium=terminal 
Booysen, W., Botes, L. A., & Hamer, W. (2017). A practical methodology for the 
systematic identification of outliers. International Conference on the Industrial 
and Commercial Use of Energy (ICUE), (1), 1–6. 
Borenstein, M., Higgins, L. V., & Rothsiein, H. R. (2009). Fixed-Effect Versus 
Random-Effects Models. In Introduction to Meta-Analysis (pp. 77–86). 
https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470743386.ch13 
Brammer, S., Millington, A., & Pavelin, S. (2009). Corporate reputation and women 
on the board. British Journal of Management, 20(1), 17–29. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8551.2008.00600.x 
Broadbent, J. (2016). A Gender Agenda. Meditari Accountancy Research, 24(2), 
169–181. 
Brown, D. A. H., Brown, D. L., & Anastasopoulos, V. (2002). Women on Boards Not 
Just the Right Thing... But the “Bright” Thing. The Conference Board of Canada, 
1(1), 16. Retrieved from 
https://utsc.utoronto.ca/~phanira/WebResearchMethods/women-bod&fp-
conference board.pdf 
Byron, K., & Post, C. (2016). Women on Boards of Directors and Corporate Social 
Performance: A Meta-Analysis. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 24(4), 428–442. https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12165 
Cairns, P. (2019). Could one of the best global investment opportunities be on the 
JSE? Retrieved January 16, 2020, from Moneyweb website: 
https://www.moneyweb.co.za/investing/could-one-of-the-best-global-investment-
opportunities-be-on-the-jse/ 
Cameron, A. C., & Trivedi, P. K. (2009). Microeconomics using Stata. Stata Press. 
86 
 
Catalyst. (2018). Women on Corporate Boards: Quick Take. Retrieved September 
28, 2019, from https://www.catalyst.org/research/women-on-corporate-boards/ 
Catalyst. (2019). Labour force participation. Retrieved September 18, 2019, from 
https://www.catalyst.org/research/women-in-the-workforce-global/ 
Censible. (2020a). Censible: Solutions. Retrieved February 28, 2020, from Censible: 
Solutions website: https://censible.co/solutions 
Censible. (2020b). Company profiles: Keyence. Retrieved from Keyence 
Environmental Social Corporate Governance Profile website: 
https://esg.censible.co/companies/Keyence-environmental-social-corporate-
governance-profile 
Cesaroni, F. M., Sentuti, A., & Buratti, A. (2015). Same crisis, different strategies? 
Italian men and women entrepreneurs in front of the economic recession. 
Journal of Research in Gender Studies, 5(2), 205–231. 
Choudhary, K. V. (2015). Impact of board size on firm performance: A study of 
selected BSE 500 companies. Apeejay Journal of Management and 
Technology, 10(1), 34–40. 
Correia, C. (2019). Financial Management (9th Edition). Cape Town: Juta and 
Company. 
Croson, R., & Gneezy, U. (2009). Gender differences in preferences. Journal of 
Economic Literature, 47(2), 448–474. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.47.2.448 
D’Amato, A., & Falivena, C. (2019). Corporate social responsibility and firm value: 
Do firm size and age matter? Empirical evidence from European listed 
companies. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, 
(August), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.1855 
Daher, P., Guillaume, Y. ., & Crawshaw, J. (2018). Tough Leaders? The Role of 
Leader/Follower Gender and Leadership Style on Leadership Effectiveness. 
Academy of Management Proceedings, 1, 14148. 
Damodaran, A. (2020). Return on Equity by Sector (US). Retrieved January 16, 
2020, from NYU Stern website: 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/roe.html 
Darnall, N., Henriques, I., & Sadorsky, P. (2010). Adopting proactive environmental 
strategy: The influence of stakeholders and firm size. Journal of Management 
Studies, 47(6), 1072–1094. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2009.00873.x 
Dias, A., Rodrigues, L. L., & Craig, R. (2017). Corporate governance effects on 
87 
 
social responsibility disclosures. Australasian Accounting, Business and Finance 
Journal, 11(2), 3–22. https://doi.org/10.14453/aabfj.v11i2.2 




Dolan, K., & Ford, L. E. (1998). Are all women state legislators alike? Women and 
Elective Office: Past, Present, and Future, 73–86. 
Dunn, P. (2012). Breaking the boardroom gender barrier: The human capital of 
female corporate directors. Journal of Management and Governance, 16(4), 
557–570. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-010-9161-2 
Eagly, A. H., & Johannesen-Schmidt, M. C. (2001). The leadership styles of women 
and men. Journal of Social Issues, 57(4), 781–797. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-4537.00241 
Eagly, A. H., & Johnson, B. T. (1990). Gender and Leadership Style: A Meta-
Analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 108(2), 233–256. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-
2909.108.2.233 
Eagly, A. H., Karau, S. J., & Makhijani, M. G. (1995). Gender and the Effectiveness 
of Leaders: A Meta-Analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 117(1), 125–145. 
Eagly, A. H., & Steffen, V. J. (1984). Gender stereotypes stem from the distribution 
of women and men into social roles. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 46(4), 735–754. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.46.4.735 
Eccles, R. G., & Saltzman, D. (2011). Achieving Sustainability through Integrated 
Design. Stanford Social Innovation Review, pp. 56–61. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/210296018?accountid=14116 
Eisenhardt, K. M., Kahwajy, J. L., & Bourgeois, L. J. (1998). Conflict and strategic 
choice: how top management teams disagree. IEEE Engineering Management 
Review, 26(1), 27–39. 
Eklund, K. E., Barry, E. S., & Grunberg, N. E. (2017). Gender and Leadership. In A. 
Alvinius (Ed.), Intech. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/57353 
England, J. (2016). Deloitte 2016 Outlook on oil and gas. 
Eweje, G., & Brunton, M. (2010). Ethical perceptions of business students in a New 
Zealand university: Do gender, age and work experience matter? Business 




Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of Ownership and Control. Journal 
of Law and Economics, 26(2), 327–349. 
Ferreira, D. (2010). Board Diversity. Corporate Governance: A Synthesis of Theory, 
Research, and Practice, 8, 225. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118258439 
Forstenlechner, I., Lettice, F., & Özbilgin, M. F. (2012). Questioning quotas: Applying 
a relational framework for diversity management practices in the United Arab 
Emirates. Human Resource Management Journal, 22(3), 299–315. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-8583.2011.00174.x 
Freeman, R. E., Wicks, A. C., & Parmar, B. (2004). Stakeholder Theory and “The 
Corporate Objective Revisited.” Organization Science, 15(3), 364–369. 
https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1040.0066 
Furlotti, K., Mazza, T., Tibiletti, V., & Triani, S. (2019). Women in top positions on 
boards of directors : Gender policies disclosed in Italian sustainability reporting. 
(December 2017), 57–70. https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.1657 
Gagliarducci, S., & Paserman, M. D. (2014). The Effect of Female Leadership on 
Establishment and Employee Outcomes: Evidence from Linked Employer-
Employee Data (No. 8647). Retrieved from 
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/106586%0AStandard-Nutzungsbedingungen: 
Gentry, R. J., & Shen, W. (2010). The relationship between accounting and market 
measures of firm financial performance: How strong is it? Journal of Managerial 
Issues, 22(4), 514–530. 
Glass, C., & Cook, A. (2016). Leading at the top: Understanding women’s challenges 
above the glass ceiling. The Leadership Quarterly, 27(1), 51–63. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2015.09.003 
Global Reporting Initiative. (2016). GRI’s History. Retrieved September 16, 2016, 
from https://www.globalreporting.org/information/about-gri/gri-
history/Pages/GRI’s history.aspx 
Glover, S. H., Bumpus, M. A., Sharp, G. F., & Munchus, G. A. (2002). Gender 
differences in ethical decision making. Women in Management Review, 17(5), 
217–227. https://doi.org/10.1108/09649420210433175 
Gordini, N., & Rancati, E. (2017). Gender diversity in the Italian boardroom and firm 




Gray, S. J., Nagata, K., Nakamura, M., & Ozu, C. (2019). Voluntary Adoption of 
IFRS: What Motivates Japanese Firms to Voluntarily Adopt IFRS? 
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3364253 
Green, C. P., & Homroy, S. (2018). Female directors, board committees and firm 
performance. European Economic Review, 102, 19–38. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2017.12.003 
Gregory-Smith, I., Main, B. G. M., & O’Reilly, C. A. (2014). Appointments, pay and 
performance in UK boardrooms by gender. The Economic Journal, 124(574), 
109–128. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12102 
Grosvold, J., Brammer, S., & Rayton, B. (2007). Board diversity in the United 
Kingdom and Norway: an exploratory analysis. Business Ethics: A European 
Review, 16(4), 344–357. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8608.2007.00508.x 
Gulzar, M. A., Cherian, J., Hwang, J., Jiang, Y., & Sial, M. S. (2019). The Impact of 
Board Gender Diversity and Foreign Institutional Investors on the Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) Engagement of Chinese Listed Companies. 
Sustainability, 11(307), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11020307 
Guo, L., & Masulis, R. W. (2015). Board Structure and Monitoring: New Evidence 
from CEO Turnovers. The Review of Financial Studies, 28(10), 2770–2811. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhv038 
Haines, E. L., Deaux, K., & Lofaro, N. (2016). The Times They Are a-Changing … or 
Are They Not? A Comparison of Gender Stereotypes, 1983–2014. Psychology 
of Women Quarterly, 40(3), 353–363. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0361684316634081 
Hair, J. F. J., Black, W. C., Babin, B. J., & Anderson, R. E. (2014). Multivariate Data 
Analysis. In Pharmaceutical Quality by Design: A Practical Approach (7th 
Edition). https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118895238.ch8 
Harjoto, M., Laksmana, I., & Lee, R. (2015). Board Diversity and Corporate Social 
Responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics, 132(4), 641–660. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-014-2343-0 
Harmony Gold Mining Company. (2017). Harmony Integrated Annual report 2017. 
Retrieved February 26, 2020, from Harmony Integrated Annual report 2017 
website: http://www.har.co.za/17/download/HAR-IR17.pdf 
Harrison, D. A., & Klein, K. J. (2007). What’s the Difference? Diversity Constructs as 
Separation, Variety, or Disparity in Organizations. The Academy of Management 
90 
 
Review, 32(4), 1199–1228. 
Heath, R., & Jayachandran, S. (2018). The causes and consequences of increased 
female education and Labour force participation in Developing Countries. In 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
https://doi.org/10.1051/matecconf/201712107005 
Hillman, A. J. (2015). Board diversity: Beginning to unpeel the onion. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 23(2), 104–107. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12090 
Hillman, A. J., Canella, A. A., & Harris, I. C. (2002). Women and racial minorities in 
the boardroom: How do directors differ? Journal of Management, 28(6), 747–
763. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0149-2063(02)00192-7 
Hoechle, D. (2007). Robust standard errors for panel regressions with cross-
sectional dependence. Stata Journal, 7(3), 281–312. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1536867x0700700301 
Hoogervorst, H. (2018). Chairman’s speech: Japan and IFRS Standards. Retrieved 
January 17, 2020, from International Accounting Standards Board website: 
https://www.ifrs.org/news-and-events/2018/08/chairmans-speech-japan-and-ifrs-
standards/ 
Hoskisson, R. E., Johnson, R. A., & Douglas, D. M. (1994). Corporate Divestiture 
Intensity in Restructuring Firms : Effects of Governance , Strategy , and 
Performance. Academy of Management Journal, 37(5), 1207–1251. 
Hoyt, C. L. (2017). Social Psychological Approaches to Women and Leadership 
Theory. In Handbook of Research on Gender and Leadership (pp. 85–99). 
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781785363863.00013 
Institute of Directors of South Africa. (2009). King III Corporate Governance Report 
for South Africa. Retrieved from http: //www.iodsa.co.za/?kingII (accessed 31st 
January 2018 and 15th April 2019) 
International Labour Organization. (2018). World Employment and Social Outlook – 
Trends for Women 2018 – Global snapshot. Retrieved from International Labor 
Organization website: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_619577.pdf 
Isidro, H., & Sobral, M. (2015). The Effects of Women on Corporate Boards on Firm 
Value, Financial Performance, and Ethical and Social Compliance. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 132(1), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-014-2302-9 
91 
 
Jackson, G., & Bartosch, J. R. (2017). Understanding Corporate Responsibility in 
Japanese Capitalism: Some Comparative Observations (No. 4). Retrieved from 
file:///C:/Users/User/Documents/UCT/Masters/Masters_2019/Literature 
review/Research papers/Papers for Lit review/Jackson (2017).pdf 
Jianakoplos, N. A., & Bernasek, A. (1998). Are women more risk averse? Economic 
Inquiry, 36(4), 620–630. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1998.tb01740.x 
Joecks, J., Pull, K., & Vetter, K. (2013). Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm 
Performance: What Exactly Constitutes a “Critical Mass?” Journal of Business 
Ethics, 118(1), 61–72. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-012-1553-6 
Johl, S. K., Kaur, S., & Cooper, B. J. (2015). Board Characteristics and Firm 
Performance: Evidence from Malaysian Public Listed Firms. Journal of 
Economics, Business and Management, 3(2), 239–243. 
https://doi.org/10.7763/joebm.2015.v3.187 
Jose, P. E., & Kilburg, D. F. (2007). Stress and coping in Japanese children and 
adolescents. Anxiety, Stress and Coping, 20(3), 283–298. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10615800701272519 
Kakabadse, N. K., Figueira, C., Nicolopoulou, K., Yang, J. H., Kakabadse, A. P., & 
Ozbilgin, M. F. (2015). Gender diversity and board performance: Women’s 
experiences and perspectives. Human Resources Management, 54(2), 265–
281. https://doi.org/10.1002/hrm 
Kang, E., Ding, D. K., & Charoenwong, C. (2010). Investor reaction to women 
directors. Journal of Business Research, 63(8), 888–894. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2009.06.008 
Kartikasari, D., & Merianti, M. (2016). The effect of leverage and firm size to 
profitability of public manufacturing companies in Indonesia. International 
Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, 6(2), 409–413. 
Kassinis, G., & Vafeas, N. (2006). Stakeholder pressures and environmental 
performance. Academy of Management Journal, 49(1), 145–159. 
https://doi.org/10.5465/AMJ.2006.20785799 
Kennedy, J. A., & Kray, L. J. (2014). Who Is Willing to Sacrifice Ethical Values for 
Money and Social Status?: Gender Differences in Reactions to Ethical 
Compromises. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 5(1), 52–59. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550613482987 
Khan, Z. A., Nawaz, A., & Khan, I. (2016). Leadership Theories and Styles: A 
92 
 
Literature Review. Journal of Resources Development and Management, 16, 1–
7. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11107-0_4 
Kharatyan, D., Lopes, J., & Nunes, A. (2017). Determinants of return on equity: 
evidence from NASDAQ 100. Retrieved January 16, 2020, from XXVII Jornadas 
Hispano-Lusas Gestión Científica website: 
https://bibliotecadigital.ipb.pt/bitstream/10198/14213/1/Determinants_ROE_Nas
daq 100.pdf 
Kim, D., & Starks, L. T. (2016). Gender diversity on corporate boards: Do women 
contribute unique skills? American Economic Review, 106(5), 267–271. 
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20161032 
Kılıç, M., & Kuzey, C. (2016). The effect of board gender diversity on firm 
performance: evidence from Turkey. Gender in Management: An International 
Journal, 31(7), 434–455. https://doi.org/10.1108/GM-10-2015-0088 
KnowTheChain. (2016). ICT Benchmark Findings Report. Retrieved February 28, 
2020, from ICT Benchmark Findings Report: June 2016 website: 
https://www.knowthechain.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/KTC_ICT-External-
Report_Web_21June2016FINAL_Small.pdf 




yOjg&sig=3LkJupXJwohcTAi-YvVbbenzhB0#v=onepage&q=data analysis using 
stata kohler&f=false 
Konrad, A. M., Kramer, V., & Erkut, S. (2008). Critical Mass:. The Impact of Three or 
More Women on Corporate Boards. Organizational Dynamics, 37(2), 145–164. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orgdyn.2008.02.005 
Kukomnik, J. (2017). No Board Refreshment Trends at S&P 1500 Firms. Retrieved 
March 12, 2020, from Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance 
website: https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/02/09/board-refreshment-trends-
at-sp-1500-firms/ 
Lee, P. M., & James, E. H. (2007). She’‐e‐os: gender effects and investor reactions 
to the announcements of top executive appointments. Strategic Management 
Journal, 28(3), 227–241. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj 
Levine, J. M. (2017). Factional conflict in groups: How majorities and minorities 
93 
 
relate to one another. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 20(5), 644–
657. https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430217702726 
Li, N., Su, H., Dong, W., & Zhu, K. (2018). The effect of non-recurring items on 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. China Journal of Accounting Research, 11(1), 21–
31. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2017.10.001 
Liao, L., Lin, T. P., & Zhang, Y. (2018). Corporate Board and Corporate Social 
Responsibility Assurance: Evidence from China. Journal of Business Ethics, 
150(1), 211–225. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-016-3176-9 
Low, D. C. M., Roberts, H., & Whiting, R. H. (2015). Board gender diversity and firm 
performance: Empirical evidence from Hong Kong , South Korea, Malaysia and 
Singapore. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 35, 381–401. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2015.02.008 
Lu, J., & Herremans, I. M. (2019). Board gender diversity and environmental 
performance: An industries perspective. Business Strategy and the 
Environment, 28(7), 1449–1464. https://doi.org/10.1002/bse.2326 
Lückerath-Rovers, M. (2012). A Comparison of Gender Diversity in the Corporate 
Governance Codes of France, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1585280 
Lückerath-Rovers, M. (2013). Women on boards and firm performance. Journal of 
Management and Governance, 17(2), 491–509. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-
011-9186-1 
Magellan Financial Group. (2016). Annual Report for the year ended 30 June 2016. 




Margaretha, F., & Supartika, N. (2016). Factors Affecting Profitability of Small 
Medium Enterprises (SMEs) Firm Listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange. Journal 
of Economics, Business and Management, 4(2), 132–137. 
https://doi.org/10.7763/joebm.2016.v4.379 
Marinova, J., Plantenga, J., & Remery, C. (2016). Gender diversity and firm 
performance: evidence from Dutch and Danish boardrooms. International 




McAvoy, K. (2016). ICT Companies Need to Take Action on Forced Labor in Supply 
Chains: Report. Retrieved February 28, 2020, from Spend Matters website: 
https://spendmatters.com/2016/07/21/ict-companies-need-to-take-action-on-
forced-labor-in-supply-chains-report/ 
Meloun, M., & Militky, J. (2011). Statistical data analysis: A practical guide. Retrieved 
from https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/mathematics/likelihood-ratio-test 
Miliken, F. J., & Martins, L. L. (1996). Searching for Common Threads : 
Understanding the Multiple Effects of Diversity in Organizational Groups. 
Academy of Management Review, 21(2), 402–433. 
Minter, R. M., Gruppen, L. D., Napolitano, K. S., & Gauger, P. G. (2005). Gender 
differences in the self-assessment of surgical residents. American Journal of 
Surgery, 189(6), 647–650. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amjsurg.2004.11.035 
Mukherjee, S. S. (2015). More educated and more equal? A comparative analysis of 
female education and employment in Japan, China and India. Gender and 
Education, 27(7), 846–870. https://doi.org/10.1080/09540253.2015.1103367 
Nadeem, M., Zaman, R., & Saleem, I. (2017). Boardroom gender diversity and 
corporate sustainability practices: Evidence from Australian Securities Exchange 
listed firms. Journal of Cleaner Production, 149, 874–885. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.02.141 
Nguyen, P., Rahman, N., Tong, A., & Zhao, R. (2016). Board size and firm value: 
evidence from Australia. Journal of Management and Governance, 20(4), 851–
873. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-015-9324-2 
Niederle, M., & Vesterlund, L. (2007). Do Women Shy Away from Competition? The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122(3), 1067–1101. Retrieved from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25098868 
Nielsen, S., & Huse, M. (2010). The contribution of women on boards of directors: 
Going beyond the surface. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
18(2), 136–148. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2010.00784.x 
Ntim, C. G. (2013). Board diversity and organizational valuation: unravelling the 
effects of ethnicity and gender. Journal of Management and Governance, 19(1), 
167–195. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-013-9283-4 
Ortas, E., Álvarez, I., & Garayar, A. (2015). The environmental, social, governance, 
and financial performance effects on companies that adopt the United Nations 




Pasour, E. C. (1981). The Free Rider as a Basis for Government Intervention. The 
Journal of Libertarian Studies, 5(4), 453–464. 
Peric, M., & Vitezic, V. (2016). Impact of global economic crisis on firm growth. Small 
Business Economics, 46(1), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-015-9671-z 
Peterson, C. A., & Philpot, J. (2007). Women’s roles on U.S. Fortune 500 boards: 
Director expertise and committee memberships. Journal of Business Ethics, 
72(2), 177–196. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-006-9164-8 
Pillinger, R. (2019). Random slope models. Retrieved January 22, 2020, from 
University of Bristol: Centre for Multilevel Modelling website: 
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/cmm/learning/videos/random-slopes.html 
Post, C., & Byron, K. (2015). Women on boards and firm financial performance: A 
meta-analysis. Academy of Management Journal, 58(5), 1546–1571. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004 
Pounder, J. S., & Coleman, M. (2002). Women – better leaders than men? In 
general and educational management it still “all depends.” Leadership & 
Organization Development Journal, 23(3), 122–133. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/01437730210424066 
Prado-Lorenzo, J. M., Rodríguez-Domínguez, L., Gallego-Álvarez, I., & García-
Sánchez, I. M. (2009). Factors influencing the disclosure of greenhouse gas 
emissions in companies world-wide. Management Decision, 47(7), 1133–1157. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/00251740910978340 
PwC. (2018). Strategy shaped by volatility. Pipeline and Gas Journal, 245(9). 
Retrieved from https://www.strategyand.pwc.com/gx/en/insights/industry-
trends/2018-oil-gas.html 
Rahman, U., Ibrahim, M. Y., & Ahmad, A. C. (2017). Accounting Profitability and 
Firm Market Valuation: A Panel Data Analysis. Global Business and 
Management Research: An International Journal, 9(1), 679. 
Ratner, B. (2009). The correlation coeffi cient : Its values range between + 1 / − 1 , or 
do they ? 17, 139–142. https://doi.org/10.1057/jt.2009.5 
Refinitiv. (2019). Environmental , Social and Governance (ESG) Scores from 





Reguera-Alvarado, N., de Fuentes, P., & Laffarga, J. (2017). Does Board Gender 
Diversity Influence Financial Performance? Evidence from Spain. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 141(2), 337–350. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-015-2735-9 
Ridgeway, C. L. (2001). Gender , Status , and Leadership. Journal of Social Issues, 
57(4), 637–655. 
Rijavec, M., & Brdar, I. (1997). Coping with school failure: Development of the school 
failure coping scale. European Journal of Psychology of Education, 12(1), 37–
49. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03172868 
Robinson, G., & Dechant, K. (1997). Building a business case for diversity. Academy 
of Management Executive, 11(3), 21–31. 
Rodriguez-Kiino, D. (2018). The role of higher education in strengthening women’s 
participation in the workforce: The lived experiences of females in Japan. Asian 
Journal of Women’s Studies, 24(3), 321–341. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/12259276.2018.1499174 
Rollins, M., Nickell, D., & Ennis, J. (2014). The impact of economic downturns on 
marketing. Journal of Business Research, 67(1), 2727–2731. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2013.03.022 
Rose, C. (2007). Does female board representation influence firm performance ? The 
Danish evidence. Corporate Governance, 15(2), 404–413. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00570.x 
Rowe, W. G., & Morrow, J. . (1999). A Note on the Dimensionality of the Firm 
Financial Performance Construct Using Accounting , Market , and Subjective 
Measures. Canadian Journal of Administrative Science, 16(1), 58–70. 
Ryan, M. K., & Haslam, S. A. (2005). The glass cliff: Evidence that women are over-
represented in precarious leadership positions. British Journal of Management, 
16(2), 81–90. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8551.2005.00433.x 
Ryan, M. K., Haslam, S. A., Morgenroth, T., Rink, F., Stoker, J., & Peters, K. (2016). 
Getting on top of the glass cliff: Reviewing a decade of evidence, explanations, 
and impact. The Leadership Quarterly, 27, 446–455. 
Sabatier, M. (2015). A women’s boom in the boardroom: effects on performance? 
Applied Economics, 47(26), 2717–2727. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2015.1008774 
Sanan, N. K. (2016). Board gender diversity and firm performance: evidence from 




Sayce, S., & Özbilgin, M. F. (2014). Pension trusteeship and diversity in the UK: A 
new boardroom recipe for change or continuity? Economic and Industrial 
Democracy, 35(1), 49–69. https://doi.org/10.1177/0143831X12462489 
Sealy, R., Singh, V., & Vinnicombe, S. (2007). The Female FTSE Report 2007: A 
Year of Encouraging Progress. In Cranfield International Centre for Women 
Leaders. Cranfield School of Management. Retrieved from 
https://dspace.lib.cranfield.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1826/3992/Female_FTSE_Re
port_2007.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y 
Sila, V., Gonzalez, A., & Hagendorff, J. (2016). Women on board: Does boardroom 
gender diversity affect firm risk? Journal of Corporate Finance, 36(December 
2013), 26–53. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.10.003 
Singh, V., Terjesen, S., & Vinnicombe, S. (2008). Newly appointed directors in the 
boardroom:. How do women and men differ? European Management Journal, 
26(1), 48–58. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.emj.2007.10.002 
Skaggs, S., Stainback, K., & Duncan, P. (2012). Shaking things up or business as 
usual? The influence of female corporate executives and board of directors on 
women’s managerial representation. Social Science Research, 41(4), 936–948. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2012.01.006 
Smith, N., & Parrotta, P. (2018). Why so Few Women on Boards of Directors ? 
Empirical Evidence from Danish Companies in 1998 – 2010. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 147(2), 445–467. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-015-2974-9 
Solanas, A., Selvam, R. M., Navaro, J., & Leiva, D. (2012). Some common indices of 
group diversity: Upper boundaries. Psychological Reports, 111(3), 777–796. 
https://doi.org/10.2466/01.09.21.PR0.111.6.777-796 
Sydney Airport Group. (2018). Annual Report 2018. Retrieved February 26, 2020, 
from Annual Report 2018 Syney Airport website: 
https://assets.ctfassets.net/v228i5y5k0x4/6nKbfG2HrgWPKFg7cvmr7B/b590dcb
9ac7f438cc1537fa7da34ae18/Sydney_Airport_Annual_Report_April.pdf 
Taylor, A. (2013). Ethics training for accountants: Does it add up? Meditari 
Accountancy Research, 21(2), 161–177. https://doi.org/10.1108/MEDAR-06-
2012-0020 
Terjesen, S., Aguilera, R. V., & Lorenz, R. (2015). Legislating a Woman’s Seat on 
the Board: Institutional Factors Driving Gender Quotas for Boards of Directors. 
98 
 
Journal of Business Ethics, 128(2), 233–251. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-
014-2083-1 
Terjesen, S., Couto, E. B., & Francisco, P. M. (2016). Does the presence of 
independent and female directors impact firm performance? A multi-country 
study of board diversity. Journal of Management and Governance, 20(3), 447–
483. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-014-9307-8 
Terjesen, S., & Singh, V. (2008). Female presence on corporate boards: A multi-
country study of environmental context. Journal of Business Ethics, 83(1), 55–
63. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-007-9656-1 
The IFRS Foundation. (2017). Who uses IFRS Standards? Retrieved December 3, 
2019, from https://www.ifrs.org/use-around-the-world/use-of-ifrs-standards-by-
jurisdiction/ 
The Johannesburg Stock Exchange. (2018). Changes to ICB & SA Sector Indices. 
Retrieved January 13, 2020, from Market Note website: 
https://www.jse.co.za/content/JSEICANoticeItems/2015/FTSE-JSE-
Africa/20180416 Market Note Changes to ICB and SA Sector Indices.pdf 
The World Bank. (2018). South africa economic update. Retrieved from 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/798731523331698204/South-Africa-Economic-
Update-April-2018.pdf 
Thomson Reuters. (2013). Thomson Reuters Datastream Economics integrates. 
https://doi.org/10.4329/wjr.v6.i10.794.Copyright 
Torchia, M., Calabrò, A., & Huse, M. (2011). Women Directors on Corporate Boards: 
From Tokenism to Critical Mass. Journal of Business Ethics, 102(2), 299–317. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-011-0815-z 
United Nations. (2016). Sustainable Development Goals. Retrieved September 16, 
2019, from https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/development-agenda/ 
Vaidya, P. N. (2019). Board Size and firm performance: A study on BSE 100 
companies. Journal of Management, 6(3), 117–123. 
Valentine, S. R., & Rittenburg, T. L. (2007). The ethical decision making of men and 
women executives in international business situations. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 71(2), 125–134. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-006-9129-y 
Van Der Ploeg, F. (2016). Fossil fuel producers under threat. Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy, 32(2), 206–222. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grw004 
van der Westhuizen, K., & Willows, G. (2016). The Relationship between Board Size 
99 
 
and Company Performance. Southern African Accounting Association (SAAA) 
National Teaching and Learning and Regional Conference Proceedings, 56–76. 
Van Staveren, I. (2014). The Lehman Sisters hypothesis. Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, 38(5), 995–1014. https://doi.org/10.1093/cje/beu010 
Wachudi, J., & Mboya, J. (2012). Effect of Board Gender Diversity on the 
Performance of Commercial Banks in Kenya. European Scientific Journal, 8(7), 
128–148. https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2012.v8n7p%p 
Weber, O., Diaz, M., & Schwegler, R. (2014). Corporate Social Responsibility of the 
Financial Sector - Strengths, Weaknesses and the Impact on Sustainable 
Development. Sustainable Development, 22(5), 321–335. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/sd.1543 
West, B. T., Welch, K. B., & Galecki, A. T. (2007). Linear Mixed Models: A Practical 
Guide Using Statistical Software (Second Edi). CRC Press. 
Willows, G., & van der Linde, M. (2016). Women representation on boards: A South 
African perspective. Meditari Accountancy Research, 24(2), 211–225. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/MEDAR-01-2016-0001 
Willows, G., & West, D. (2014). Differential Investment Performance In South Africa 
Based On Gender And Age. International Business & Economics Research 
Journal (IBER), 14(3), 537. https://doi.org/10.19030/iber.v14i3.9215 
World Economic Forum. (2018a). The Global Gender Gap Report 2018. Retrieved 
August 31, 2019, from Insight Report website: 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2018.pdf 
World Economic Forum. (2018b). Two myths about the 2008 crisis. Retrieved 
November 21, 2019, from https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/10/two-myths-
of-the-2008-meltdown/ 
World Economic Situation and Prospects. (2014). Country classification. In Country 
classification. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781849809566.00015 
Xero Limited. (2017). Xero Limited 2017 Annual Report. Retrieved February 26, 
2020, from Xero Limited Annual Report website: 
https://www.xero.com/content/dam/xero/pdf/Xero Annual Report FY17.pdf 
Yang, P., Riepe, J., Moser, K., Pull, K., & Terjesen, S. (2019). Women directors, firm 
performance, and firm risk: A causal perspective. The Leadership Quarterly, 
30(5), 101297. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2019.05.004 
Yasser, Q. R., Al Mamun, A., & Ahmed, I. (2017). Corporate Social Responsibility 
100 
 
and Gender Diversity: Insights from Asia Pacific. Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Environmental Management, 24(3), 210–221. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/csr.1400 
Zelechowski, D. D., & Bilimoria, D. (2004). Characteristics of women and men 
corporate inside directors in the US. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 12(3), 337–342. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2004.00374.x 
Zillman, C. (2019). The Fortune 500 Has More Female CEOs Than Ever Before. 
Retrieved February 6, 2020, from Fortune website: 
https://fortune.com/2019/05/16/fortune-500-female-ceos/ 
 
